

Cold War America Lesson 2:

Containing Communism Abroad

Major Topics:

- Founding of the United Nations
- Creation of NATO and Warsaw Pact
- National Security Act
- NSC-68
- Iran Coup d'état
- Korean War
- Bay of Pigs
- Cuban Missile Crisis
- Hungarian Revolution
- Guatemalan Coup d'état

How did the United States wage the Cold War abroad?



Douglas MacArthur at the front lines above Suwon, Korea, accompanied by Courtney Whitney, Matthew B. Ridgway, William B. Kean, and others, January 28, 1951. Source: Library of Congress, <http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2003655442/>

In order to wage the Cold War abroad, the United States' government reorganized within to fight against a new enemy in a new kind of war. It centralized government operations and established a new interventionist foreign policy (The Truman Doctrine) devoted to supporting anti-communists all over the world. To carry out this policy, American presidents utilized the American military and the CIA to aid people who were trying to confront communists abroad, and to intervene when American interests were being threatened.

This lesson employs a variety of engaging primary sources, including declassified government documents, as source material for student investigation. Sentence deconstruction activities help students understand dense and abstract national security documentation.

Procedures

Step 1: The United Nations (Class Time: 15 minutes)

Coming out of WWII, the leaders of the Allied nations were determined to establish a structure for international engagement that would prevent another world war in the future. As early as 1943, the “Big Three” – FDR, Stalin, and Churchill began to plan for a post-war world. By 1945 when they met in Yalta, the Allied leaders



were in agreement – creation of The United Nations would be one of their first major post-war actions. Despite its goals of tolerance and peace, the UN became a repeated site of Cold War conflict. Students begin this lesson by learning about the UN’s creation – its goals and composition – in order to understand how the institution later became deeply involved in the tensions that defined the Cold War.



Distribute **The United Nations (CWA2.1)**. Remind students about the League of Nations and how its failure helped contribute to WWII. Next, ask students to consider the question – How did the Big Three plan to avoid the mistakes of their predecessors? In other words, what could they do to help prevent a third world war? In groups of three or four, have students examine both the Preamble and the poster. Have students discuss the answers to the questions listed below; circulate around the room to make sure their analysis is appropriate and informed.

Step 2: NATO and the Warsaw Pact (Class Time: 30 minutes)



Distribute NATO and the Warsaw Pact (CWA2.2). Explain to students that two alliances formed at the beginning of the Cold War – NATO, created in 1947, and the Warsaw Pact, created in 1950. NATO was led by the United States; the Warsaw Pact was led by the Soviet Union. Use the Warsaw Pact / NATO map to clarify memberships in both organizations. Finally, have students review selected sections of the NATO and Warsaw Pact treaties using the matrix that organizes excerpts from the two treaties by topic. (Students can also refer to the longer excerpts as necessary). Finally, have students answer the following question: Consider the potential impact of these two military alliances on international relations. Will they expand tensions between countries or will they promote greater peace and stability? Explain.

Step 3: The National Security Act (Class Time: 15 minutes)



Ask students to review the key points of Lesson 1, as well as the unit’s essential question (Why was the Cold War fought?). Explain that this lesson will focus on HOW the United States fought the Cold War, and how its tactics related to its motivations (Refer to Lesson 1 sources, as necessary). In particular, make sure that all students understand the Truman Doctrine, which argued for containment of communism, using the notes the text of Truman’s March, 1947 speech and their analysis (**CWA1.10**).



In July of that same year, Congress passed and President Truman signed into law The National Security Act of 1947. Tell students that now that they understand why the Cold War was fought, they will now need to answer the question, how did the US fight the Cold War? Distribute the excerpt from **The National Security Act of 1947 (CWA2.2)**. In groups of three or four, have students and discuss their answers to the questions listed on page four, using the Three World Order Map, the NSA, and the Truman Doctrine. As they work, circulate around the room, correcting any misunderstandings as necessary (refer to the key, **CWA2.2K**). Ask students to consider: What is the connection between Truman's speech in March, and the passage of the National Security Act in July?



Remind students that they should continue to complete their **Organizing the Cold War Chart (CWA1.3b)**. In addition to their student copies, make sure the class chart is updated as the lesson goes forward.

Step 4: NSC-68 (Class Time: 45 minutes)



As a review, discuss main points of the NSA and then give students the document **NSC-68 (CWA2.4)**, a plan drafted by the National Security Council to contain Soviet expansion through aggressive US foreign intervention. Although the excerpt is short (only three paragraphs), the text is very dense and challenging because of the level of abstraction, the use of reference devices and metaphors, and the passive voice. Given that, both English learners and native speakers will likely require structured support in order to both comprehend the literal text and discern subtle meanings needed for historical understanding. **CWA2.4** takes apart the text, asks questions to ensure comprehension, and then requires students to make an argument based upon evidence. The activity



is structured primarily as a group discussion – students work in pairs or groups of three to first deconstruct the text and then analyze their results. The role of the teacher is to monitor each group's discussion, providing additional guidance and clarification if necessary. If, however, student proficiency requires closer monitoring or guidance, the activity can be adapted as a whole class discussion or differentiated between similar groups, with the teacher slowly progressing through each paragraph, using the discussion questions as a script and requiring detailed note-taking by each student.

Step 5: The President's Daily Bulletin (Class Time: 200 minutes, estimated)



Tell students that today you are moving from policy to practice, and will now look at different events, policies, and military actions in which the US uses its strength to shape international political outcomes. Explain to the class that they will now consider the implementation of the containment policy, as defined by NSC-68 by analyzing one event, policy, military action, or foreign intervention in order to answer the following question: Was Containment Successful?



Following the instructor directions on the first page of **President's Daily Bulletin (CWA2.5)**, divide the class into ten diverse groups and prepare **President's Daily Bulletin** documentation for each group. Explain to students that they have each been assigned a separate event, activity, policy, or military action for their review. Each group will get a portfolio of "classified" documents to use to prepare a concise description, analysis, and recommendation for the **President's Daily Bulletin**. Following the specific directions included in the student directions cover page, each group will need to prepare both a five minute oral presentation, as well as a one- to two-page written report. As students prepare their bulletins, it is imperative that the teacher monitor their development, correct any misunderstandings, support additional research as necessary, and ensure reasonable and accountable distribution

of work. The "classified" documents are at varying levels of reading difficulty. Below is a quick guide for the topics that would be more or less accessible depending on students' reading levels:

Least-Challenging	Medium	Challenging
Italy	Korea	Nuclear Arms Race
Berlin Wall	Iran	Guatemala
Cuban Missile Crisis	Bay of Pigs	
	Hungary	

When students are ready, have each group present their report to you, the President, and the rest of the class (who, when not presenting, will serve as members of the National Security Council). Let students know that while they will become experts on their particular event / policy, they will eventually be responsible for learning about all of the events as they will have to write up their own analysis at the conclusion of the activity. As students present, make sure to both ask questions to assess their understanding of the material, correct any misinformation, and the most significant information presented. In particular, make sure that each presentation addresses the central question of the activity: Was Containment Successful?

CWA2.1- The United Nations (Page 1 of 3)

Context: Coming out of WWII, the leaders of the Allied nations sought to establish a structure for international engagement that would prevent another world war in the future. As early as 1943, the “Big Three” – FDR, Stalin, and Churchill – began to plan for a post-war world. By 1945 when they met in Yalta, the Allied leaders were in agreement – creation of The United Nations would be one of their first major post-war actions.

Representatives from 50 countries met in San Francisco at the United Nations Conference on International Organization in 1945, with the goal of creating a United Nations Charter. On June 26, 1945, the fifty representatives signed the United Nations Charter and on October 24, 1945, The United Nations was officially created when China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and a majority of representatives ratified the Charter.



Washington, D.C. Joseph C. Grew, Undersecretary of State for the United States and foreign officials and representatives signing the declaration by United Nations and lend-lease agreements, February, 1945. J. Sherrel Lakey, Photographer. Farm Security Administration, Office of War Information Photograph. Source: Library of Congress, <http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/owi2001043219/PP/>.

Directions: Review the Preamble to the United Nations Charter, the United Nations Poster, and Joseph Stalin’s 1951 interview. In your groups, answer the following questions:

- Read the Preamble.
 - What are the specific goals of the UN? What are they trying to achieve?
 - How do they hope to achieve these goals?
- Look at the poster.
 - What, specifically, do you see?
 - Identify as many country flags as you can – what countries belong to the organization?
 - What does the black smoke represent? What about the ships in the water?
- Consider both sources.
 - In what ways are the two sources alike? How are they different?
 - In no more than one sentence, answer the following question: How did the United Nations hope to prevent war?

CWA2.1- The United Nations (Page 2 of 3)


Charter of the United Nations: Preamble

We the Peoples of the United Nations Determined

- ✓ to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
- ✓ to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and
- ✓ to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and
- ✓ to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

And for these Ends

- to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and
- to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and
- to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and
- to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,



Charter of the United Nations: Preamble (Poster), 1941-45.

Source: National Archives, **ARC Identifier 515901**,

<http://arcweb.archives.gov/arc/action/ExternalIdSearch?id=515901>

Have Resolved to Combine our Efforts to Accomplish these Aims

Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations.

CWA2.1- The United Nations (Page 3 of 3)



The United Nations Fight for Freedom (Poster), 1942-45. Source: National Archives, ARC Identifier 515902, <http://arcweb.archives.gov/arc/action/ExternalIdSearch?id=515902>

CWA2.2- NATO and Warsaw Pact



CWA2.2- NATO and Warsaw Pact

Context: In 1949, the US, Great Britain, France, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Portugal all formed the North American Treaty Organization, or NATO, a military alliance that sought to "...promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic Area." Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/stock_publications/20120822_nato_treaty_en_light_2009.pdf

The North Atlantic Treaty

Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty :



The Standing Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Discusses Military Planning, August 21, 1950. Source: Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives Accession Number 63-1324-11.

<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/photographs/displayimage.php?pointer=52430>

Article 1: The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2: The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

CWA2.2- NATO and Warsaw Pact

The North Atlantic Treaty (continued)

Article 3: In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article 4: The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article 5: The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security .



*General Dwight Eisenhower and the Standing Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ca. 1951 Source: Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives Accession Number 63-1324-09
<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/photographs/displayimage.php?pointer=52431>*

CWA2.2- NATO and Warsaw Pact

Context: After West Germany joined NATO in 1955, the Soviet Union and its satellite states in Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia) joined together as their own military alliance, the Warsaw Pact, signed May 1, 1955. *Soviet News* first published the text of the Warsaw Pact Treaty on May 16, 1955. This translated text is excerpted from a copy from the World History Sourcebook, <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1955warsawpact.html>.

The Warsaw Pact

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, CO-OPERATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE

...Reaffirming their desire for the organisation of a system of collective security in Europe, with the participation of all the European states, irrespective of their social and state systems, which would make it possible to combine their efforts in the interests of securing peace in Europe,

Taking into consideration at the same time the situation obtaining in Europe as the result of ratification of the Paris agreements, which provide for the formation of a new military grouping in the shape of the "Western European Union" together with a remilitarised Western Germany, and for the integration of Western Germany in the North Atlantic bloc, which increases the threat of another war and creates a menace to the national security of the peace-loving states,

Convinced that, under these circumstances, the peace-loving states of Europe should take the necessary measures for safeguarding their security, and in the interests of maintaining peace in Europe,

Guided by the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter,

In the interests of further strengthening and promoting friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance, in accordance with the principles of respect for the independence and sovereignty of states, and also with the principle of noninterference in their internal affairs...



Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-30483-002 / CC-BY-SA, Warsaw Pact Conference, Warsaw Poland, May 11, 1955. Source: German Federal Archive, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-30483-002_Warschau_Konferenz_Europ%C3%A4ischer_L%C3%A4nder....jpg

CWA2.2- NATO and Warsaw Pact

The Warsaw Pact (continued)

Article 1: The contracting parties undertake, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations Organisation, to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force, and to settle their international disputes by peaceful means so as not to endanger international peace and security.

Article 2: The contracting parties declare their readiness to take part, in the spirit of sincere co-operation, in all international undertakings intended to safeguard international peace and security and they shall use all their energies for the realisation of these aims.

Moreover, the contracting parties shall work for the adoption, in agreement with other states desiring to co-operate in this matter, of effective measures towards a general reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction.

Article 3: ...They shall take council among themselves immediately, whenever, in the opinion of any of them, there has arisen the threat of an armed attack on one or several states that are signatories of the treaty, in the interests of organising their joint defence and of upholding peace and security.

Article 4: In the event of an armed attack in Europe on one or several states that are signatories of the treaty by any state or group of states, each state that is a party to this treaty shall, in the exercise of the right to individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations Organisation, render the state or states so attacked immediate assistance, individually and in agreement with other states that are parties to this treaty, by all the means it may consider necessary, including the use of armed force. The states that are parties to this treaty shall immediately take council among themselves concerning the necessary joint measures to be adopted for the purpose of restoring and upholding international peace and security.

In accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations Organisation, the Security Council shall be advised of the measures taken on the basis of the present article. These measures shall be stopped as soon as the Security Council has taken the necessary measures for restoring and upholding international peace and security-.

Article 5: The contracting parties have agreed on the establishment of a joint command for their armed forces, which shall be placed, by agreement among these parties, under this command, which shall function on the basis of jointly defined principles. They shall also take other concerted measures necessary for strengthening their defense capacity...to provide safeguards against possible aggression.

Article 8: The contracting parties declare that they will act in the spirit of friendship and co-operation with the object of furthering the development of, and strengthening the economic and cultural relations between them, adhering to the principles of mutual respect for their independence and sovereignty, and of non-interference in their internal affairs.

CWA2.2- NATO and the Warsaw Pact

Directions: Review the following excerpts from the founding treaties of each alliance, which have been organized by topics of discussion. In the third column, note any major similarities or differences between the two treaties. Finally, answer the following question in no more than 150 words, using at least three specific quotes from the treaties: Consider the potential impact of these two military alliances on international relations. Will they expand tensions between countries or will they promote greater peace and stability? Explain.

Topic / Section	NATO	Warsaw Pact	Analysis: Similar or Different – explain.
Introduction to Treaty	<p>... They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.</p> <p>They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.</p> <p>They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.</p>	<p>...Reaffirming their desire for the organisation of a system of collective security in Europe... in the interests of securing peace in Europe,</p> <p>Taking into consideration at the same time the ... formation of a new military grouping in the shape of the "Western European Union" together with a remilitarised Western Germany, and for the integration of Western Germany in the North Atlantic bloc, which increases the threat of another war and creates a menace to the national security of the peace-loving states,</p> <p>... In the interests of... promoting friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance, in accordance with the principles of respect for the independence and sovereignty of states, and also with the principle of noninterference in their internal affairs,</p>	
How will they settle disputes?	<p>The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. (article 1)</p>	<p>The contracting parties undertake, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations Organisation, to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force, and to settle their international disputes by peaceful means so as not to endanger international peace and security. (article 1)</p>	

CWA2.2- NATO and the Warsaw Pact

Topic / Section	NATO	Warsaw Pact	Analysis: Similar or Different – explain.
How will they cooperate economically?	The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them. (article 2)	Not specifically addressed	
How will they cooperate militarily?	In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. (article 3)	In the event of an armed attack in Europe on one or several states that are signatories of the treaty by any state or group of states, each state that is a party to this treaty shall, in the exercise of the right to individual or collective self-defence ... render the state or states so attacked immediate assistance, individually and in agreement with other states that are parties to this treaty, by all the means it may consider necessary, including the use of armed force. (article 4)	
What about nuclear weapons?	Not specifically addressed	...the contracting parties shall work for the adoption, in agreement with other states desiring to co-operate in this matter, of effective measures towards a general reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction. (article 2)	
Relationship with the Security Council and the UN?	<p>... in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, (article 5)</p> <p>Any such armed attack ...shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. (article 5)</p>	<p>...in exercise of the right to individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations Organisation. (article 4)</p> <p>...the Security Council shall be advised of the measures....These measures shall be stopped as soon as the Security Council has taken the necessary measures for restoring and upholding international peace and security. (article 4)</p>	

CWA2.3 - The National Security Act of 1947 (Page 1 of 4)

Public Law 253, 80th Congress; Chapter 343, 1st Session; S. 758.

AN ACT

To promote the national security by providing for a Secretary of Defense; for a National Military Establishment; for a Department of the Army, a Department of the Navy, and a Department of the Air Force; and for the coordination of the activities of the National Military Establishment with other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with national security...

TITLE I—COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

National Security Council

Sec. 101 (a) There is hereby **established a council to be known as the National Security Council** ...

The function of the Council shall be to **advise the President** with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military **policies relating to the national security** ...

The Council shall be composed of the President; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense...; the Secretary of the Army...; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force...; the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board....

(b) ... the duty of the Council – (1) to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security...

Central Intelligence Agency

Sec. 102 (a) There is hereby **established under the National Security Council a Central Intelligence Agency** with a Director of Central Intelligence.... The director shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate...

(d) ...it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council –

(1) to **advise the National Security Council** in matters concerning such **intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as [they] relate to national security**;

(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to national security... *Provided*, That the **Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions**: *Provided further*, That the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence: *And provided further*, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;

CWA2.3-The National Security Act of 1947 (Page 2 of 4)

National Security Resources Board

Sec. 103 (a) There is hereby established a National Security Resources Board....

(c) It shall be the function of the Board to advise the President concerning the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization, including – (1) policies concerning industrial and civilian mobilization in order to assure the most effective mobilization and maximum utilization of the Nation’s manpower in the event of war;

Title II – THE NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

Sec. 201 (a) There is hereby established the National Military Establishment and the Secretary of Defense shall be the head thereof. (b) The National Military Establishment shall consist of the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force...

The Secretary of Defense

Sec. 202 (a) **There shall be a Secretary of Defense, who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.... The Secretary of Defense shall be the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the national security.**



[Editor’s note: Congress amended this act multiple times in the years that followed, folding the National Military Establishment and the National Security Resources Board into the Department of Defense (in 1949), and **by 1953, granting the CIA the power to collect national intelligence information through “human sources and other appropriate means”**].

Excerpted from The National Security Act of 1947, Public Law 80-253, 61 STAT 495. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, <http://research.archives.gov/description/299856>. A current version of this law, last amended in January of 2012, can be found here: <http://www.house.gov/legcoun/Comps/CI449.pdf>.

A world map illustrating the division of the world into three major spheres of influence during the Cold War. The map is color-coded as follows:

- United States (Light Blue):** Includes North America (USA and Canada), Western Europe (UK, France, West Germany), Greece, Turkey, and Australia.
- Soviet Union (Red):** Includes the Soviet Union USSR, East Germany, North Korea, China, North Vietnam, and North Laos.
- Third World (Yellow-Green):** Includes Mexico, Central America (Guatemala), South America (Chile), Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Congo, Angola, South Africa), the Middle East (Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan), South Korea, South Vietnam, Cambodia, India, and Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Philippines, Laos, Vietnam).

■ First World (anti-communist, "free world") ■ Second World (communist) ■ Third World (decolonized)

CWA2.3-The National Security Act of 1947 (Page 4 of 4)

Directions: In groups of three or four, first discuss and then write your answers to the following questions, in order, using your copy of the Truman Doctrine (CWA1.10), The National Security Act of 1947 (NSA), and the Three World Order Map. Whenever appropriate, cite actual quotes from the Act to support your answer.

1. The NSA established the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. What were the goals of each?

Central Intelligence Agency:

National Security Council:

Secretary of Defense:

2. The NSA also centralized the different branches of the military (the army, the navy, and the air force). Why?

3. What restrictions were placed upon the CIA, both in 1947 and in 1953?

4. In your opinion, what section(s) of the National Security Act would most interest the Soviet Union? Why?

5. Consider the Three World Order Map. How might this map and the NSA help American leaders put the Truman Doctrine into practice?

CWA2.4 – NSC-68 (page 1 of 6)

Background: On April 14, 1950, the National Security Council sent a report to President Truman, detailing a plan for containment of Soviet influence. Later known as NSC-68, the plan argued for an aggressive US foreign policy to combat Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe and communist expansion in the developing world. This excerpt from NSC – 68 makes a forceful argument in favor of expanding containment by first describing Soviet intentions, then considering the likely impact of these intentions on American security, and then detailing specific goals to combat Soviet aggression.

Directions: In pairs or groups of three, first read through each paragraph carefully, organizing the text in the chart below and defining any unfamiliar terms. Next, discuss the questions that follow each paragraph – making sure everyone at your table is in agreement. Finally, as a group, be prepared to answer the following question using specific quotes from the excerpt: “How does NSC-68 support or change the goals of the Truman Doctrine?”

Paragraph #1:

[T]he Soviet Union...is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical [in opposition] to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world. Conflict has, therefore, become endemic [prevalent or common] and is waged, on the part of the Soviet Union, by violent or non-violent methods in accordance with the dictates of expediency [what works best]. With the development of increasingly terrifying weapons of mass destruction, every individual faces the ever-present possibility of annihilation [total destruction] should the conflict enter the phase of total war...

Condition / Connection	Subjects (Nouns or Noun Phrases)	Verbs or Verb Phrases	Who or What? / Context
	The Soviet Union	is animated	by a new fanatic faith, antithetical [in opposition] to our own
And			its absolute authority over the rest of the world.
		has, therefore, become	endemic [prevalent or common]
And		is waged	
in accordance with the dictates of expediency [what works best].			
With the development of increasingly terrifying weapons of mass destruction	every individual	Faces	the ever-present possibility of annihilation

CWA2.4 – NSC-68 (page 2 of 6)

For Discussion:

1. In the first sentence, the author describes the Soviet Union as “animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own....”
 - The term “fanatic faith” is used to describe what Soviet belief?
 - “Antithetical” means in opposition to. Whose beliefs are in opposition to Soviet “faith”?

2. The paragraph refers to a conflict but only names one side in the conflict – the Soviet Union. Who is the Soviet Union in conflict with?

3. In the last sentence, the author refers to “weapons of mass destruction”, “total war,” and “annihilation.” Given what you know about the Cold War and this period of time, what do you think these terms mean, specifically?

4. In the first two sentences, the report refers to conflict between countries, but in the last sentence, the subject switches to an individual. Why do you think the authors of the document made this switch?

CWA2.4 – NSC-68 (page 3 of 6)

Paragraph #2:

In a shrinking world, which now faces the threat of atomic warfare, it is not an adequate objective merely to seek to check the Kremlin design, for the absence of order among nations is becoming less and less tolerable. This face imposes on us, in our own interests, the responsibility of world leadership. It demands that we make the attempt, and accept the risks inherent in it, to bring about order and justice by means consistent with the principles of freedom and democracy...The seeds of conflicts will inevitably exist or will come into being. To acknowledge this is only to acknowledge the impossibility of a final solution. Not to acknowledge it can be fatally dangerous in a world in which there are no final solutions...

Condition / Connection	Nouns or Noun Phrases	Verbs or Verb Phrases	Who or What? / Context
In a shrinking world, which now faces the threat of atomic warfare	it		
Merely		to seek to check	
For	the absence of order among nations	is becoming	
	It	demands	
That	we	Make	the attempt,
and			
in it		to bring about	order and justice
	means consistent with the principles of freedom and democracy		
The		will inevitably exist or will come into being.	
To acknowledge	this	is only to acknowledge	the impossibility of a final solution.
	it	can be	
	in a world in which	there are no	

CWA2.4 – NSC-68 (page 4 of 6)

For Discussion:



1. Consider the first sentence: "In a shrinking world, **which** now faces the threat of atomic warfare, **it** is not an adequate objective merely to seek to check the Kremlin design, for **the absence of order among nations** is becoming less and less tolerable."
 - a. The author uses three words (bolded here) that refer back or forward to specific nouns or noun phrases. Draw arrows to show what terms these refer to. The first one is done for you.
 - b. What do you think the phrase "Kremlin design" means? (Hint – where is the Kremlin?)
 - c. The author argues that it is "not an adequate objective merely to seek to check." Rewrite this phrase in your own words. (Note – in this context, the word "check" means restrain. Also be sure to pay attention to the negative qualifiers "not" and "merely," which affect meaning).
 - d. "...for the absence of order among nations is becoming less and less tolerable." What, specifically, is not tolerable? To whom is it not tolerable?

2. Reread the second and third sentences: "**This face** imposes on us, in our own interests, the responsibility of world leadership. **It** demands that we make **the attempt**, and accept the risks inherent in **it**, to bring about order and justice by means consistent with the principles of freedom and democracy..."
 - a. The bolded "This face," "It," and "it" all refer back to a noun phrase in the first sentence. What are these bolded words referring to?
 - b. The author refers to "us" and "we" in these sentences. Who is "we" and "us" and why do you think they personalize this section?
 - c. The bolded "the attempt" refers to a verb phrase that follows in the same sentence. Draw an arrow from "the attempt" to the phrase it refers to.

3. Consider the fourth – sixth sentences: "The seeds of conflicts will inevitably exist or will come into being. To acknowledge **this** is only to acknowledge the impossibility of a final solution. Not to acknowledge **it** can be fatally dangerous in a world in which there are no final solutions..."
 - a. Define "seeds" and "conflict." Given those definitions, what do you think the metaphor "seeds of conflicts" means?
 - b. Draw an arrow from the bolded words "this" and "it" to the noun phrase they reference.
 - c. To whom is the author referring to when he suggests "to acknowledge" and "not to acknowledge?" In other words, who is being warned?
 - d. The report warns of a "final solution." Given the time period, what do you think this means?

CWA2.4 – NSC-68 (page 5 of 6)

Paragraph #3:

As for the policy of "containment," it is one which seeks by all means short of war to (1) block further expansion of Soviet power, (2) expose the falsities of Soviet pretensions, (3) induce a retraction of the Kremlin's control and influence, and (4) in general, so foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system that the Kremlin is brought at least to the point of modifying its behavior to conform to generally accepted international standards.

It was and continues to be cardinal in this policy that we possess superior overall power in ourselves or in dependable combination with other like-minded nations.

Condition / Connection	Nouns or Noun Phrases	Verbs or Verb Phrases	Who or What? / Context
	it	Is	one which seeks by all means short of war
		to (1) block	
		to (2) expose	the falsities of Soviet pretensions
and (4) in general,		so foster	the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system
that the		is brought	
			to generally accepted international standards.
	It	was and continues to be	
	we		superior overall power in ourselves or in dependable combination with other like-minded nations.

CWA2.4 – NSC-68 (page 6 of 6)

For Discussion:

1. Review the section: “As for the policy of “containment,” **it** is one which seeks by all means short of war to (1) block further expansion of Soviet power, (2) expose the falsities of Soviet pretensions, (3) induce a retraction of the Kremlin’s control and influence, and (4) in general, so foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system that the Kremlin is brought at least to the point of modifying its behavior to conform to generally accepted international standards.

It was and continues to be cardinal in **this policy** that we possess superior overall power in ourselves or in dependable combination with other like-minded nations.”

- a. The bolded words “it,” “It,” and “this policy” refer back to what term?
- b. Take a look at the verbs in the first sentence – how do they characterize or describe American plans to deal with the Soviet Union?
- c. Reread the last sentence – who are “we” and “like-minded nations” referring to? What do these countries need to have to be successful?
- d. If this policy is successful, how will Soviet behavior change?

NSC-68 and the Truman Doctrine

Instructions: using specific quotes from both the Truman Doctrine and NSC-68, answer the following question in no more than 200 words: How does NSC-68 support or change the goals of the Truman Doctrine?

In your answer, be sure to:

- Clearly define, in your own words, what the Truman Doctrine was and how it hoped to achieve its goals.
- Include a minimum of three separate and distinct quotes from NSC-68 to show how the policy would take the ideas embedded in the Truman Doctrine to shape American foreign policy.

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Directions)

Background: The National Security Council “...advises the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security ...” You staff the Security Council, working for the Director of National Intelligence, providing needed analysis and recommendations to help shape US foreign policy and strategic decision-making, as part of the *President’s Daily Bulletin*. Your latest assignment is to conduct a selective review of American foreign policy from 1947 – 1965 in order for the President (and the rest of the Council) to develop an informed answer to the following question: **“What foreign policy was the most effective containment strategy?”**

You and your team of analysts have been assigned one policy, action, event, or military engagement. You have also been provided with a series of classified documents, images, maps, and timelines to bring you quickly up to speed. (Additional research is also permitted, but please limit your analysis to the requirement section below). Your assignment is to use these resources to develop two brief reports – one oral and one in writing – in order to clearly and concisely explain what happened, who was involved, and the outcome of the event. Each group will take a turn presenting their policy or event to the rest of the Council. When you are not presenting, you’ll need to pay careful attention to the other groups as your final requirement will be selecting the most effective strategy and providing specific reasons for your selection.

Requirements:

Each group will need to provide both an **oral presentation** (3-5 minutes, with visual aids) and **written report** (1 page, front and back – enough copies for the whole class). *Both reports need to include the following information: what happened, when, who was involved, outcome, and your analysis – was it an effective example of containment? Why or why not?*

Evaluation:

Each member of the group will be evaluated on the following: their understanding of the event or policy, their ability to answer questions about the event or policy, and their ability to compare this event with the Truman Doctrine. *The group as a whole* will be evaluated on the quality of their presentation, their creativity, clear writing and speaking, and interaction as a team.

Finally, please note that when you are not presenting, you’ll need to pay careful attention to the other presentations as each student will individually be responsible for providing a final answer to the question, “What foreign policy was the most effective containment strategy?” using detailed evidence gleaned from the individual presentations.

Your team: _____

Your policy / event / military strategy: _____

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Nuclear Arms Race)

Timeline

1942

- US begins work on the Manhattan Project, a research and development effort that produced the first atomic bombs. As the project moves forward, Soviet spies secretly report on its developments to Moscow.

Summer, 1945

- On July 16, the US detonates the first nuclear device at the Trinity test site in New Mexico.
- On July 24, Truman officially briefs Stalin on the development project at the Potsdam Conference.
- The US drops two atomic weapons on Japan to end WWII. “Little Boy” was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6; “Fat Man” was dropped on Nagasaki on August 8.

1946

- At its first General Assembly meeting in January, the United Nations forms the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, whose stated goal was the elimination of all nuclear weapons.
 - In response, the US proposes the Baruch Plan, which advocated for an international body to provide oversight. The USSR calls for universal disarmament. Both proposals were rejected by the UN.
- In the summer of 1946, the US government tests two more bombs in the Bikini Atoll in the Pacific.

1949

- On August 29, the Soviet Union detonates its first atomic weapon, called RDS-1 by the Soviets, and both “Fast Lightning” and “Joe-1” (after Joseph Stalin) by the West.

1950

- Emil Fuchs was convicted of spying for the Soviet Union. Fuchs confessed and was sentenced to fourteen years in prison. Fuchs was a German theoretical physicist who became a British citizen during WWII. After the war, Fuchs worked on the Manhattan Project in New Mexico and passed information about the development of the hydrogen bomb onto the Soviet Union.
- Harry Gold was also convicted as a Soviet spy – Gold served as a courier for Fuchs, helping transport information from the Manhattan Project to the Soviet Union.

1952

- On November 1, the US detonated “Mike,” the first hydrogen bomb.

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Nuclear Arms Race)

Timeline (continued)

1953

- Soviets detonate their first thermonuclear bomb that could be dropped from an airplane.

1954

- On March 1, the US conducts the BRAVO test of a hydrogen bomb, again at Bikini Atoll. The largest nuclear explosion yet by the US, the bomb yielded 14.8 megatons of destruction, which spread nuclear fallout up to 300 miles away.

1955

- The USSR detonates its first hydrogen bomb on November 22 with a 1.6 megaton yield. By 1961, the Soviets’ hydrogen bombs had a 58 megaton yield.

1957


- The USSR launches Sputnik, a satellite, into Earth’s orbit. Development of this technology demonstrated that the Soviet Union could not only utilize air bombers to deliver nuclear weapons – they could launch them across continents. In response, the US launches its own satellite in 1959.
- By the late-1950s, both the US and the USSR had the capability of not only launching a first strike against each other, both could also survive a first strike and launch a response, known as a second strike. This knowledge provided a sense of security and deterrence for the two superpowers. Known as Mutually Assured Destruction, or MAD, both sides were reluctant to attack the other because they knew that their opponent could still surmount a second strike, which would lead to their annihilation. MAD spurred on the arms race as each side sought to maintain equal or greater capacity for destruction, and thus assured, paradoxically, their own safety.

1962

- In October, the US and the Soviet Union came closest to nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis, when the Soviet Union sought to secretly place nuclear missiles on Cuban soil, capable of quickly reaching the territorial United States. President Kennedy responded by blockading Soviet ships sailing to complete the final installation. As tensions mounted during the crisis, Kennedy increased military alertness to DEFCON 3, the level just before nuclear war. Thankfully, back door negotiations ended the crisis. The Soviets agreed to remove the missiles and their bases from Cuba. In response, the US removed their missiles from Turkey, which threatened the Soviet Union.

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Nuclear Arms Race)

Second atomic bombing of Nagasaki, Japan, August 8, 1945. Official US Army Air Force photograph. Source: Library of Congress, <http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/98506956/>.



CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Nuclear Arms Race)

Mushroom cloud with ships below during Operation Crossroads nuclear weapons test on Bikini Atoll, July, 1946. Source: Library of Congress, <http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2012648160/>



CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Nuclear Arms Race)

Little Denise Davidson, 5 months old, sleeps peacefully while her mother, Mrs. Donald Davidson, of 278 Clinton St., Bklyn., marches with ban-the-bomb group outside the United Nations to protest resumption of A-[bomb] tests by the United States / World Telegram & Sun photo by Dick DeMarsico, 1962. Source: Library of Congress, <http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/00649688/>.




CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Nuclear Arms Race)

Persons picketing against the use of tax dollars for the development of nuclear weapons] / World-Telegram photo by Fred Palumbo, March 15, 1950. Source: Library of Congress, <http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/95506930/>.



CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Nuclear Arms Race)


Truman's handwriting on the back of a Potsdam photograph describing telling Stalin about the atomic bomb: "In which I tell Stalin we expect to drop the most powerful explosive ever made on the Japanese. He smiled and said he appreciated my telling him--but he did not know what I was talking about--the Atomic Bomb! HST". 1945. Source: Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives Accession # 63-1456-46A, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/photographs/view.php?id=14584>.



CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Nuclear Arms Race)


Scientists’ Petition to the President of the United States, July 17, 1945. Source: Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum,

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents/index.php?documentdate=1945-07-17&documentid=79&studycollectionid=abomb&pagenumber=1.



CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Nuclear Arms Race, White House Release)

Press Release by the White House, August 6, 1945. Source: Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents/index.php?pagenumber=2&documentid=59&documentdate=1945-08-06&studycollectionid=abomb&groupid=.



CWA 2.5 – The President's Daily Bulletin (Nuclear Arms Race, White House Release)

have come from that arrangement. Under that general policy the research on the atomic bomb was begun. With American and British scientists working together we entered the race of discovery against the Germans.

The United States had available the large number of scientists of distinction in the many needed areas of knowledge. It had the tremendous industrial and financial resources necessary for the project and they could be devoted to it without undue impairment of other vital war work. In the United States the laboratory work and the production plants, on which a substantial start had already been made, would be out of reach of enemy bombing, while at that time Britain was exposed to constant air attack and was still threatened with the possibility of invasion. For these reasons Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt agreed that it was wise to carry on the project here. We now have two great plants and many lesser works devoted to the production of atomic power. Employment during peak construction numbered 125,000 and over 65,000 individuals are even now engaged in operating the plants. Many have worked there for two and a half years. Few know what they have been producing. They see great quantities of material going in and they see nothing coming out of these plants, for the physical size of the explosive charge is exceedingly small. We have spent two billion dollars on the greatest scientific gamble in history -- and won.


But the greatest marvel is not the size of the enterprise, its secrecy, nor its cost, but the achievement of scientific brains in putting together infinitely complex pieces of knowledge held by many men in different fields of science into a workable plan. And hardly less marvelous has been the capacity of industry to design, and of labor to operate, the machines and methods to do things never done before so that the brain child of many minds came forth in physical shape and performed as it was supposed to do. Both science and industry worked under the direction of the United States Army, which achieved a unique success in managing so diverse a problem in the advancement of knowledge in an amazingly short time. It is doubtful if such another combination could be got together in the world. What has been done is the greatest achievement of organized science in history. It was done under high pressure and without failure.

We are now prepared to obliterate more rapidly and completely every productive enterprise the Japanese have above ground in any city. We shall destroy their docks, their factories, and their communications. Let there be no mistake; we shall completely destroy Japan's power to make war.


- 2 -

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Nuclear Arms Race, Evaluation of Atomic Bomb)


Editor’s Note: The following document is an excerpt from, “Evaluation of the Atomic Bomb as a Military Weapon,” was a June 30, 1947 report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Evaluation Board for Operation Crossroads, the name of the Bikini Atoll tests. The report was prepared for President Truman and is part of the President’s Secretary Collection at the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents/index.php?pagenumber=1&documentdate=1947-06-30&documentid=81&studycollectionid=abomb.




CWA 2.5 – The President's Daily Bulletin (Nuclear Arms Race, Evaluation of Atomic Bomb)



CWA 2.5 – The President's Daily Bulletin (Nuclear Arms Race, Evaluation of Atomic Bomb)




CWA 2.5 – The President's Daily Bulletin (Nuclear Arms Race, Evaluation of Atomic Bomb)



CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Nuclear Arms Race, Reaction to Sputnik)

Reaction to the Soviet Satellite (Sputnik) – A Preliminary Evaluation, 1957. White House Office of the Staff Research Group, Box 35, Special Projects: Sputnik, Missiles and Related Matters. Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library and Museum, http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/sputnik/Reaction.pdf.



CWA 2.5 – The President's Daily Bulletin (Nuclear Arms Race, Reaction to Sputnik)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 4 -

In judging the long-range significance of reaction, one finding of 1956 public opinion surveys in Western Europe and Japan is of particular interest. Asked whether they expected the U.S. or the USSR to emerge the stronger in peaceful "competitive coexistence" over the next twenty-five years, a substantial body of opinion answered "the USSR"; the average U.S. lead in the five chief West European countries was only eleven per cent.

A final point that deserves noting is the fact that the U.S. itself set the stage for assuring the impact of the Sputnik — first by the fanfare of its own announcement of its satellite plans, second by creating the impression that we considered ourselves to have an invulnerable lead in this scientific and technological area, and third by the nature of the reaction within the U.S. All this has served to underscore the importance, implications, and presumed validity of Soviet performance and Soviet claims. American anxiety, recrimination, and intense emotional interest have been widely noted abroad, and assiduously reported by Soviet media. The nature of U.S. public reaction in the immediate future will continue to be an important factor in coloring the responses of other people. One moral that might be drawn is that a propagandist cannot have his crow and eat it too.

This has all helped to increase the credibility of Soviet propaganda, although presumably no U.S. reaction, however serene and poised, could have markedly diminished the basic gain in credibility derived from the incontestable fact that the Soviet system had achieved difficult and impressive scientific "first." This gain in credibility, which can be exploited by every aspect of Soviet propaganda, may in the long run be the most durable and useful gain accruing to the USSR from the satellite.

In sum:


1. The Soviet satellite supplies an opportunity for the USSR to claim that it has opened a new era, marked by a spectacular overtaking of the U.S. in a vital field where we have been accustomed to count on superiority, and now competes with the U.S. as an equal;
2. Public opinion will, for a period that cannot now be forecast, be narrowly assessing the relative military positions of the U.S. and the USSR;
3. The USSR, in this same period, will have a clear advantage in the cold war, which it can exploit for either "peaceful" gestures or ventures in increased pressures — or both simultaneously.
4. The satellite, presented as a demonstration that the Soviet system has gained scientific and technical superiority, lends increased appeal to that system particularly in areas that view their problems as requiring the rapid achievement of a higher technological level;
5. General Soviet credibility has been sharply enhanced.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IRI/P:October 16, 1957

CWA 2.5 – The President's Daily Bulletin (Nuclear Arms Race)

Director of Central Intelligence R.H. Hillenkoetter, memorandum to the President, "Estimate of the Status of the Russian Atomic Energy Project," 6 July 1948, Top Secret. Source: Harry S. Truman Library, Presidents Secretary's File, box 249, Central Intelligence-Memoranda 1945-1948 (copy courtesy of Jeffrey Richelson). Online access: National Security Archive at George Washington University: <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb286/doc03.PDF>.



TOP SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2430 E STREET NW.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

22729

6 July 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Estimate of the Status of the Russian Atomic Energy Project

In the interval since the 15 December 1947 report on the Status of the Soviet Atomic Energy Program was issued, no information has been received that necessitates changes in the argument of that report. It has remained necessary to rely on knowledge of the United States, British, and Canadian experience in order to project present information into the future. Information received since December adds somewhat to our knowledge of the scope and details of the USSR's project, but it continues to be impossible to determine its exact status or to determine the date scheduled by the Soviets for the completion of their first atomic bomb. It has been learned, however, that in the summer of 1947 the highest Soviet authority was seriously disturbed by the lack of progress.

On the basis of the evidence now in our possession, it is estimated that the earliest date by which it is remotely possible that the USSR may have completed its first atomic bomb is mid-1950, but the most probable date is believed to be mid-1953. Further discussions with geological consultants, further literature studies, and such information as has been received from the field lead to the conclusion that previous estimates of the total reserves of uranium available to the USSR were low. As a result, the estimated production of bombs has been increased. It is now believed that the maximum number of bombs in the Soviet stockpile in 1955 will be not more than 20 if the first bomb is completed in 1953, or not more than 50 if it is completed in 1950.

The above report was delivered to the Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee of which Senator Hickenlooper is the Chairman and in addition has also been disseminated to the Armed Services and the Department of State. This report, although prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, was examined and concurred in by the intelligence agencies of the State, Army, Navy and Air Force Departments as well as by the Atomic Energy Commission.

No Change in Class. ☐

☐ Declassified

Class. Changed to: **TS** ☒ **C**

Next Review Date: **1992**


Auth: **HR 76-2**

Date: **29 April 1982** By: **48531**

R. H. HILLENKOETTER
Rear Admiral, USN
Director of Central Intelligence

cc - Executive Secretary
National Security Council

03793



TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: **85-43**

By: **CA**

DATE: **12-14-95**

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Italy)

Timeline

1946

- After the end of WWII, Italy becomes a republic, under the leadership of Alcide De Gasperi.
- De Gasperi leads a coalition government composed of the Christian Democratic Party (De Gasperi’s party, or the DC), the Italian Communist Party (PCI), and the Italian Socialist Party (PSI).

1947

- DeGasperi’s coalition weakens; US intelligence reports call for increased support of DeGasperi’s leadership to balance increasing support of the Communist Party by the Soviet Union.
- DeGasperi forces PCI and PSI out of power; the ousted leaders of the Italian left threaten civil war in response.

1948

- On February 25, Communists seize power in nearby Czechoslovakia, with Soviet backing. American leadership fears similar fate for Italy, especially after learning of Soviet support for Italian Communist movement.
- US gives millions in aid to Christian Democratic Party to pay for campaign expenses and media.
- On April 18, Christian Democrats win Italian election easily and proceed to establish a new government without Communist membership.

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Italy)

Source: The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/it.html>



CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Italy)

Editor’s note: the following document is excerpted from the CIA’s Weekly Summary report of September 12, 1947. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/assessing-the-soviet-threat-the-early-cold-war-years/5563bod1.pdf>

5. Weekly Summary Excerpt, 12 September 1947, Italian Communist Intentions

~~TOP SECRET~~

ITALIAN COMMUNIST INTENTIONS.

The imminent withdrawal of Allied troops from Italy has increased the possibility of direct Communist action to seize power and has rendered more effective other Communist methods for taking control of the country. Although Communist Leader Togliatti this week has, in effect, issued a call to arms against the De Gasperi Government, other Communist tactics appear more likely under present conditions.

In carrying out their offensive, the Italian Communists have open to them two main courses of action: (1) sudden overthrow of the De Gasperi Government by Communist-sponsored armed force, following withdrawal of Allied troops; and (2) Communist-inspired general strikes to paralyze the important north Italian industrial area, and thus seriously interfere with future implementation of the program for European recovery.

By the employment of tactics similar to those used in Greece, the first course is within the realm of possibility. Although the Italian Army and Carabinieri have some 200,000 troops to oppose approximately 50,000 Communist guerrillas, the addition of partially-armed and trained Italian and Yugoslav Communists and fellow-travellers could appreciably increase the strength of the revolutionists. Furthermore, redeployment of Italian armed forces to protect the Yugoslav frontier following the withdrawal of Allied forces would remove certain troop units from important Communist-dominated centers in north Italy.

Recent developments within the Communist Party in Italy may increase the likelihood of direct military action. There has long been a division within the Italian Communist Party between the Togliatti faction, which has favored peaceful political infiltration, and the pro-revolutionary group headed by Luigi Longo (member of the International Brigade during the Spanish civil war and Partisan leader in Italy during World War II). The recent departure of eight members of the “direct action” group for Moscow may indicate closer coordination between this element and the USSR and consequent intensification of Communist paramilitary activity. Togliatti’s last speech may mean that he will go along with the revolutionary faction.

- 2 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

CWA 2.5 – The President's Daily Bulletin (Italy)

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Two factors, however, militate against Communist revolution in Italy. The USSR is unwilling to support directly such a step because it might involve war with the US. An even more potent reason against it is that the failure of the European recovery program, or even failure of the US to provide Italy with emergency wheat and dollars during this critical interim period, might deliver Italy into the hands of the Communists by popular vote at the next national elections. It would therefore seem more logical for the Italian Communists to await the outcome of the elections, scheduled for April 1948, before using revolutionary tactics.

The continuation of threats and intimidation is, of course, a permanent policy, and any Communist statements regarding the necessity for violence can be considered to be made partly for propaganda purposes. *will be* It will be remembered that Togliatti made a speech threatening "direct action" prior to the Sicilian elections in April, and it is certain that the leftist majority in that former stronghold of conservatism was created in part by the Sicilians' terror of Communist reprisals. *e*

Of the two courses of action, the second seems most likely, *already for them was #2 was - had to be page - should have spelled out.* and there is evidence that it has already been embarked upon. Paralysis of the north Italian industrial section, which is perhaps second only to the Ruhr in its importance to the European economy, through "spontaneous" general strikes could defeat the operation of the European recovery program and eventually throw not only Italy into the Soviet orbit, but possibly France as well. The strike of 600,000 agricultural workers in the Po Valley, which began on 9 September, indicates that the Communists are now making every effort to bring production to a standstill.

Communist-sponsored strikes are causing a further deterioration of the critical economic situation, which has already compelled the Premier to appeal for emergency wheat from the US in order to restore Italy's essential pasta ration. The De Gasperi Government must cope in some way with the desperate economic crisis before the 23 September meeting of the Constituent Assembly, when a vote of no confidence proposed by Left Wing Socialist Nenni *2 left wing* will be discussed.

- 3 -

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CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Korea)

Timeline

1910:

- Korea annexed by Japan as a colony.

1945:

- At the Potsdam Conference, Allied leaders agree to divide Korea in half, with the Soviet Union overseeing the North and the US overseeing the South.

1948:

- Soviet troops leave the Korean peninsula, leaving Kim Il-sung as leader over the communist northern part of Korea, the Korean People’s Republic (KPR),

1949:

- American troops leave the Korean peninsula, Pro-American Syngman Rhee served as the leader of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the southern part of the peninsula. (map #1)

June 25, 1950:

- North Korean troops cross the 38th Parallel in an invasion of South Korea. (map #1) Il-sung had the use of Soviet-built weaponry, and over 90,000 troops.



CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Korea – Part I)

Timeline (continued)

June 28, 1950:

- Seoul, the capitol of South Korea, falls to northern forces.
- In response, the United Nations passed a resolution recommending that “members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security to the area.”
- The KPR, meanwhile, had the support of China, a communist neighbor to the north, by way of weaponry, money, and military personnel.

June 30, 1950:

- President Truman announces that he had “authorized the United States Air Force to conduct missions on specific military targets in Northern Korea [and] a naval blockade of the entire Korean coast.” Truman also explained that “General MacArthur has been authorized to use certain supporting ground units.”
- North Korean forces had advanced all the way to the southeast corner of the Korean peninsula. (map #2)




September, 1950:

- Resisting defeat, General Douglas MacArthur (the US leader of UN forces) planned an **amphibious** invasion at the Port of Inchon in September and changed the tide of the war.

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Korea)

Fall, 1950

- In September, American/UN forces recaptured control of Seoul by the end of the month, and then pushed north to invade the KPR. (map #3)
- In October they seized the capital, Pyongyang. (map #4)
- In November China intervened and sent troops to attack UN forces in North Korea. China had warned the UN that they would oppose the establishment of an American-allied Korea on its southern border, and acted to prevent the destruction of the KPR.



CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Korea)


Timeline (continued)

Winter and Spring, 1951:

- In January, American/UN forces evacuated Seoul as Chinese and North Korean forces pushed further south. (map #5)
- In March, American/UN forces reclaimed Seoul after a series of successful counter-offensive measures, and pushed forward to the 38th Parallel.
- By the end of April, American/UN forces had inflicted heavy casualties on the Chinese and North Koreans

July, 1951:

- The first armistice negotiations begin, with the 38th Parallel as the proposed boundary between the two countries.




August, 1951 – July, 1953:

- This period is generally referred to as a stalemate. Occasional offensives occurred during these two years, with little exchange of territory and each side weighing the heavy costs of the war.

July, 1953:

- The final armistice was signed, with the 38th Parallel still standing as the boundary between North and South Korea. (map #6). A demilitarized zone still exists today on either side of the boundary.

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Korea)



Correspondence Between
South Korean leader Syngman
Rhee and Harry S. Truman,
With Related

Material, February 7, 1949.


Official File, Truman Papers.

Source: the Harry S. Truman
Library,

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/koreanwar/documents/index.php?pagenumber=5&documentdate=1949-02-07&documentid=kr-2-8

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Korea, CIA S. Korea Analysis)

Editor’s Note: The following excerpt is from a report to President Truman from the CIA detailing the agency’s analysis of communist infiltration into South Korea. It was done before the war started. Source: Harry S. Truman Library, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-8-6.pdf#zoom=100



CWA 2.5 – The President's Daily Bulletin (Korea, CIA S. Korea Analysis)

ORE 32-48

COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES IN SOUTH KOREA

SUMMARY

Communist capabilities in South Korea are now at a low level and probably will be further reduced if the Republic continues its present trend toward increased stability.

The network of Communist organizations in South Korea is designed to provide control mechanisms for every segment of society and is sufficiently broad to draw new members from all classes should a severe economic crisis cause popular discontent and a swing to the left. The number of South Koreans who have consistently braved various degrees of police action to assist the Communist program may exceed 600,000, while the total number of Koreans enrolled in Communist front organizations may exceed 10 percent of the 20 million population. Underground combat organizations under Communist control and leadership are scattered throughout the mountain areas of South Korea and present a continuing threat to internal security.

The Communists in South Korea are under the direct control of Soviet agents in North Korea. Their adherence to the Moscow line has incurred the hostility and distrust of Korean nationalists, and periodic mass arrests of Communist leaders have forced them to concentrate organizational efforts on rebuilding party channels and strengthening the underground forces. The anti-Communist program undertaken by the Republic of Korea, since its inauguration in August 1948, has forced many Communist leaders to flee to the North.

The Communists have failed to control labor and have lost the ability they possessed in September 1946 to call a general strike. They have, however, improved their technique of coordinated sabotage as demonstrated in the anti-election campaign of February 1948. They have devoted considerable effort, with some success, to infiltrating youth groups, political parties, the security forces, and the government on all levels.

Current Communist propaganda is aimed at creating confusion, fear, and defeatism in the South. The constant threat of invasion from the North and the susceptibility of the isolated villagers to propaganda can be exploited by the Communists to produce these results in local areas. But the Communists have lost the advantage they possessed in the fall of 1948 when it appeared to the Koreans that the US was about to withdraw all troops, leaving the infant Republic to face alone the combined forces of Communism in the Far East. Favorable UN action on Korea, the expectancy of continued US aid under ECA, and the moderate success of security forces in suppressing the guerrillas have restored confidence in their future among the people and officials of South Korea.

The mission of the Communist forces in South Korea is to assist in carrying out the Soviet plan for the eventual absorption of South Korea into the Korean Democratic Peoples Republic by undermining popular government support through the creation

Note: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force have concurred in this report. The information herein is as of 10 February 1949.

CWA 2.5 – The President's Daily Bulletin (Korea, CIA S. Korea Analysis)

of political and economic chaos, dissipating the military strength of the Republic, and developing the conviction that Communist domination is inevitable, thereby achieving a favorable psychological climate for opportunist "coalition" with the north.

The present Communist strength in South Korea does not appear great enough to support a sustained, country-wide campaign that would accomplish this mission. The limitation of their future potential, however, depends primarily on the ability of government officials and the people to resolve their personal or party differences in presenting a united front to the Communists, and on the ability of the government to insure a minimum standard of living for both the farmer and the urban worker.

as indication of Communist strength. The number of South Koreans who have conscientiously braved various degrees of police action to assist the Communist program may exceed 500,000. Through the usual technique of indoctrinating individuals, the relatively small group of loyal and experienced Communists control political, social, and cultural organizations whose total membership may exceed 25 percent of the population. In addition to the members of the Communist Front organizations who have generally followed the party line, many more Koreans may be sympathetic to Communist propaganda and leadership on specific or local issues.


Communist prestige, based on their leadership of nationalist resistance to the Japanese, was highest at the time of liberation. In the absence of other political leadership, the Communists were able to assume leadership of the grass-roots independence movement which found expression in the establishment of the People's Committee throughout Korea in August 1945. In the following months, however, the Communists, by espousing USSR rather than Nationalist objectives, dissipated a substantial portion of their prestige and incurred the enmity of significant groups of the population.

Although membership in the Communist Party or its front organizations was technically legal during the period of American Military Government, the police generally regarded the Communists as rebels and traitors who should be seized, imprisoned, and now have shot on the slightest provocation. All Communist activity was effectively outlawed with the passage of the Law on the Nation's Public Peace in November 1948. The Communists have become a militant underground force, not a part of normal community life throughout most of South Korea today.

Organization

The Communist organization in South Korea is designed to provide control mechanisms for every segment of society. It is, in fact, a state within a state under the nominal control of UNR-approved leaders. The Communist "front" organizations include political parties, labor unions, cultural and intellectual societies, farmers' associations, and youth groups. In addition, the Communists have developed underground militant organizations to serve as their revolutionary striking force. The network of these organizations is sufficiently broad to allow the attainment of two main goals: first, all segments of society should be aware of the existence of the Communist Party; second, all segments of society should be aware of the existence of the Communist Party's militant organizations and a willing to the left.

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Korea, CIA S. Korea Analysis)




CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Korea, NSC 8/2)

Editor’s Note: The following is an excerpt from a report on Korea from the National Security Council to President Truman. The report was prepared more than a year before North Korea invaded South Korea.

Source: Harry S. Truman Library,

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-7-8.pdf#zoom=100



CWA 2.5 – The President's Daily Bulletin (Korea, NSC 8/2)

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REPORT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO KOREATHE PROBLEM

1. To re-assess and re-appraise the position of the U. S. with respect to Korea as defined in NSC 8 of April 2, 1948, in the light of developments since the adoption of that position.

ANALYSIS

2. a. Objectives of U. S. policy in Korea as defined by NSC 8:

(1) The broad objectives of U. S. policy with respect to Korea are:

(a) to establish a united, self-governing, and sovereign Korea as soon as possible, independent of foreign control and eligible for membership in the UN;

(b) to ensure that the government so established shall be fully representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people;

(c) to assist the Korean people in establishing a sound economy and educational system as essential bases of an independent and democratic state.

A more immediate objective is the withdrawal of

NSC 8/2

- 1 -

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CWA 2.5 – The President's Daily Bulletin (Korea, NSC 8/2)

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retained in Korea pending a definitive decision with respect to final troop withdrawal.

(3) Concurrently with the foregoing developments, Soviet occupation authorities in north Korea, after refusing to permit the UN Temporary Commission on Korea to visit that area, conducted "elections" and established and accorded recognition to a puppet "Democratic People's Republic", all in flagrant disregard of the clearly expressed will of the GA as expressed in the Resolution of November 14, 1947. On December 25, 1948 the Soviet Government announced that it had completed the withdrawal of its occupation forces from north Korea.

(4) During the third session of the GA the U. S. co-sponsored (together with Australia and China) a resolution, adopted on December 12, 1948 over the opposition of the Soviet bloc, which approved the report of the Temporary Commission and declared "that there has been established a lawful government (the Government of the Republic of Korea), having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of all Korea reside; that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such Government

NSC 8/2

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CWA 2.5 – The President's Daily Bulletin (Korea, NSC 8/2)

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as patrol boats and other craft necessary to enable it to prevent infiltration by sea along the extensive Korean coastline, or to provide water transport for the movement of security forces into troubled areas. Although the Korean Government is eager to build an air force, U. S. supplies for this purpose have been limited to twelve observation type aircraft. The present Army training schedule calls for the completion of training up to the regimental level by June 1, 1949.

The effective maintenance of these security forces is and will continue for the foreseeable future to be wholly dependent upon military, economic, and technical assistance from the U. S.

(7) Although Soviet occupation forces as such are believed in fact to have been withdrawn from north Korea as announced by the Soviet Government, they have left behind a well-organized "People's Army", officered in part by Soviet-citizen Koreans who formerly served in the Red Army, and advised by Red Army personnel attached to the Soviet "Embassy" in north Korea. The strength of the north Korean Army and security forces is estimated at from 75,000 to 95,000. The most recent (February 3) estimate of the hard core of these forces, the North Korean People's Army, fixes its strength as 56,040. Special border constabulary, police, railway guards, and other security forces are estimated to total at least

NSC 8/2

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CWA 2.5 – The President's Daily Bulletin (Korea, NSC 8/2)

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another 30,000. In Manchuria, furthermore, there are reported to be other Korean units in service with Chinese Communist forces or in training that equal or exceed the combined army and security forces now in north Korea. The North Korean People's Army is reported to be equipped principally with Soviet weapons and materiel, with emphasis on infantry mortars and automatic weapons. Small numbers of fighter and reconnaissance aircraft were reportedly transferred to north Korea early in 1948 by Soviet forces.

c. Effect of Soviet aims on determination of U. S. policy in Korea:

(1) The persistent refusal of the USSR to cooperate in good faith with the U. S. in formulating a just and mutually acceptable solution to the Korean problem, and its further refusal to collaborate with the UN in its efforts to bring about the creation of a united and independent Korea, have made inescapable the conclusion that the predominant aim of Soviet policy in Korea is to achieve eventual Soviet domination of the entire country. A derivative objective of Soviet policy has been to establish in the Soviet zone of occupation a politically "dependable" puppet government which can be used as a vehicle for the eventual extension of Soviet control throughout the Korean peninsula. As

NSC 8/2


- 10 -

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CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Korea, Aquino Letter)

Editor’s Note: The following is a letter from an ordinary woman, Carolyn Aquino, to President Truman, June 28, 1950. Source: Harry S. Truman Library,


http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/koreanwar/documents/index.php?documentdate=1950-06-28&documentid=ki-11-1&pagenumber=1



CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Korea, Truman Notes)

Editor’s Note: The following is a hand-written note by President Harry S. Truman, June 30, 1950. Source: Harry S. Truman Library,

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ma-2-2.pdf#zoom=100



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


June 30 50

Frank Pace called at 5 A.M. E.D.T. I was already up and shaved. Said MacArthur wanted two divisions of ground troops. Authorized a regiment to be used in addition to the authorizations of yesterday, to be used at Mac's discretion.

Was briefed by Col Geoff at seven o'clock. Called Pace and Louis Johnson and told them to consider giving MacArthur the two divisions he asked for

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Korea, Stalin Interview)

Editor’s Notes: In February of 1951, Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin was interviewed by a *Pravda* correspondent, asked specifically about the UN’s involvement in Korea. His remarks were published in *Soviet News*. An excerpt from that interview follows:



Joseph Stalin, Secretary-general of the Communist party of Soviet Russia, 1942. Source: Farm Security Administration, the Library of Congress, <http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/owi2001045684/PP>

"The United Nations Organization, which was created as a bulwark for keeping peace, has been transformed into an instrument of war, a means to unleash a new world war. The aggressive core of the United Nations Organization have formed the aggressive North Atlantic pact from ten member states (the USA., England, France, Belgium, Canada, Holland, Luxemburg, Denmark, Norway, Iceland) and twenty Latin-American countries...

Thus, the United Nations Organization, from being a world organization of nations with equal rights, has changed into an instrument of a war of aggression. In reality, the United Nations Organization is now not so much a world organization as an organization for the Americans and treats American aggression as acceptable.

...in the United States of America, in England and also in France, there are aggressive powers that long for a new war. They need war to achieve super-profits and to plunder other countries. These are the billionaires and millionaires that regard war as a fountain of revenue, that brings colossal profits.

They, the aggressive powers, hold the reactionary governments in their hands and guide them. But at the same time they are afraid of their people who do not want a new war and are for the keeping of peace. Therefore they take the trouble of using the reactionary governments to ensnare their people with lies, to deceive them, to represent a new war as a war of defense, and the peaceful politics of peace-loving countries as aggressive. They take the trouble to deceive the people, to force them and draw them into a new war with their aggressive plans."

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Korea)



Douglas MacArthur at the front lines above Suwon, Korea, accompanied by Courtney Whitney, Matthew B. Ridgway, William B. Kean, and others, January 28, 1951. Source: Library of Congress, <http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2003655442/>

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Korea)

SC346078 - Pfc. Letcher V. Gardner (Montgomery, Iowa), Co D, 8th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, fires on an emplacement of the Communist-led North Koreans, along the Naktong River, near Chingu. 13 August 1950. Korea.

Signal Corps Photo #8A/FEC-50-6133 (Meyers). Source: US Army, <http://www.history.army.mil/photos/Korea/kor1950/kor1950.htm>.



CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Korea)

SC382567 - KOREAN CONFLICT
Showing the entrance to his bunker at the edge of crater caused by an enemy mortar shell is Corporal George C. Brown, Boston, Massachusetts, Company L, 3rd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, 1st US Cavalry Division. 17 October 1951. Korea. Signal Corps Photo #8A/FEC-51-37983 (Davis). Source: US Army, <http://www.history.army.mil/photos/Korea/kor1951/kor1951.htm>



CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Korea)

With her brother on her back a war weary Korean girl tiredly trudges by a stalled M-26 tank, at Haengju, Korea., 06/09/1951


Item from Record Group 80:
General Records of the
Department of the Navy, 1804 –
1983. Source: National Archives,
[http://www.archives.gov/global-
pages/larger-
image.html?i=/research/military/k
orean-war/images/girl-with-baby-
l.jpg&c=/research/military/korean
-war/images/girl-with-
baby.caption.html](http://www.archives.gov/global-pages/larger-image.html?i=/research/military/korean-war/images/girl-with-baby-l.jpg&c=/research/military/korean-war/images/girl-with-baby.caption.html)




CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Korea, Directive to UN Commander)

Editor’s Note: The following is a directive for President Truman to assign to the Commander of the United Nations Forces in Korea, prepared by Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall, September 27, 1950. Source: Harry S. Truman Library,

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ki-18-3.pdf#zoom=100.




CWA 2.5 – The President's Daily Bulletin (Korea, Directive to UN Commander)



CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Korea, MacArthur’s Korea Statement)

Editor’s Note: The following is copy of remarks made by General Douglas MacArthur to the New York Times, March 25, 1951. Source: President’s Secretary Files, Harry S. Truman Library, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/koreanwar/documents/index.php?pagenumber=1&documentdate=1950-12-15&documentid=kp-2-8




CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Korea, Intelligence Report)

Editor’s Note: The following is a memo from the Department of State’s Office of Intelligence Research, Intelligence Report 5775, January 20, 1952 Source: Harry S. Truman Library,

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/koreanwar/documents/index.php?pagenumber=1&documentdate=1952-01-30&documentid=kp-3-3

RE. Spielman

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



Office of Intelligence Research

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 10501

Intelligence Report

No. 5775 Date: January 30, 1952

NUMBERS OF VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF PRISONERS AND INTERNEES PUT FORWARD IN THE CEASE-FIRE TALKS

RESTRICTED
SECURITY INFORMATION

Prisoners-of-war Held by the Communist Forces

The Communist delegation's list of December 18 contained 11,559 names:

- 7,142 Republic of Korea
- 3,198 US
- 919 British
- 234 Turks
- 40 Filipinos
- 10 French
- 6 Australian
- 4 South African
- 3 Japanese (apparently not in military service)¹
- 3 Canada, Greece, and Netherlands

The Republic of Korea had announced on December 7 that 88,390 ROK soldiers were missing in action.² The US at the time the lists were exchanged listed 11,042 missing in action.³ In a letter of December 21, the UN negotiators called the Communists' attention to the omission of more than one thousand names from their prisoner-of-war list.⁴ Net on the December 18 list were 31 of the 50 reported to the Red Cross on August 18, 35 of the 60 reported to the Red Cross on September 14, and 1,005 named in other sources. In a letter dated December 26, the Communists stated that of these, 726 had died of various causes or had escaped, and

1. New York Times, December 19, 1951.
2. T-543, Fusan, December 7, 1951, UNCLASSIFIED.
3. New York Times, December 23, 1951.
4. FBIS, Daily Report, Far East, December 27, 1951, pp. EEE-1-3, RESTRICTED. The names were listed in the letter.

THIS IS AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT AND NOT A STATEMENT OF DEPARTMENTAL POLICY

Final analysis of the material contained in this report was concluded on January 30, 1952 by the Division of Research for Far East.

RESTRICTED
SECURITY INFORMATION

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CWA 2.5 – The President's Daily Bulletin (Korea – Part II, Intelligence Report)

~~RESTRICTED~~
SECURITY INFORMATION



2

the whereabouts of 332 was unknown at that time.¹ Late in December the UN Command called attention to Communist communiques claiming more than 65,000 prisoners.²

Civilian Internees Held by the Communist Forces

The ROK claimed on December 17 that more than 88,000 south Korean civilians had been seized and taken north by the Communists.³ On December 30, the UN delegation inquired concerning 55 non-Korean civilians: 25 French, 13 American, 9 British, 4 Irish, 2 Belgian, 1 Austrian, and 1 Australian.⁴ On January 25, the Communist radio named 48 non-Korean civilians interned, including 27 of the abovementioned 55.⁵

Prisoners-of-war Held by the UN

The UN December 18 reported 132,474 prisoners-of-war: 95,531 north Koreans, 20,700 Chinese, and 16,243 dissident south Koreans.⁶ The Communist delegation letter of December 26 asserted that the UN list contained 1,456 fewer names than the UN had said it did, and contained 44,205 names fewer than reported to the Red Cross.⁷ The UN undertook to explain the removal of the 44,000, but as late as January 24, it was reported that the Communist delegation was pressing for information concerning 37,000 persons the UN stating that these were civilian internees.⁸ On January 28, the UN delegation presented a new list, written in Oriental characters, containing 132,080 names, 20,720 Chinese and 111,360 Koreans.⁹

Civilians Internees in south Korea

The UN has made no statement concerning numbers of civilian internees or of refugees under its control. The ROK Department of Social Affairs once issued a statement that 400,000 north Koreans had come to south Korea during the fighting. On January 1, 1952, the Communist delegation inquired whether the 500,000 persons taken from north Korea by the UN forces would be returned in the contemplated exchange.¹⁰

1. FBIS, Daily Report, Far East, December 27, 1951, pp. EEE-1-3, ~~RESTRICTED~~. The names were listed in the letter.
2. T-1442, to New Delhi, January 17, 1952, ~~RESTRICTED~~ cites north Korean broadcasts of February 9, 1951 and April 8, 1951 stating that in the periods June 25 -- December 25, 1950 and December 26, 1950 to March 25, 1951, 38,500 and 26,863 prisoners respectively were taken -- a total of 65,363.
3. T-573, Pusan, December 17, 1951, UNCLASSIFIED.
4. New York Times, December 31, 1951.
5. FBIS ticker, January 25, 1952, ~~RESTRICTED~~.
6. Ibid., December 19, 1951.
7. FBIS, Daily Report, Far East, p. EEE-1-3, ~~RESTRICTED~~.
8. New York Times, January 25, 1952.
9. Ibid., January 29, 1952.
10. Ibid., January 2, 1952.

~~RESTRICTED~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 10501

2

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Iran)

Timeline:

1935:

- The Anglo Persian Oil Company, Ltd. (APOC) was formed to export oil from Iranian fields. (APOC was later renamed the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC - 1935), and ultimately, British Petroleum (1954). In 1950, the company owned the largest oil refinery in the world, in Abadan, Iran. From 1914 – 1977, the British government owned the majority of the company.

1951:

- Mohammed Mossadeq (Mossadegh), the head of Iran’s Oil Committee, became Premier of Iran on April 28.
- Once elected, Mossadeq led a political movement to nationalize Iran’s oil fields. Nationalizing the oil fields would take ownership away from the AIOC and give it to the Iranian Government.
- Mossadeq’s plan, which he argued would end poverty in Iran, was opposed by the AIOC and the British and American governments, who felt this involuntary transfer of ownership (and thus profits) was an illegal theft of private property that threatened their economic security by restricting their access to needed oil. The west also believed that Mossadeq’s actions demonstrated communist sympathy.
- The Shah of Iran signed the official documentation nationalizing Iranian oil fields on May 2.
- British oil workers leave Iran; American and British governments proclaim boycott of Iranian oil. As a result, the Iranian oil industry comes to a standstill.

1952:

- By July, the oil boycott had seriously weakened the Iranian economy and hurt Mossadeq’s popularity. Violent demonstrations take place in Tehran, Iran’s capital.
- Mossadeq issues a statement severing ties with the British government.

1953:

- The Central Intelligence Agency and MI6 (the British Intelligence Agency or Secret Intelligence Service – SIS) secretly work with the Iranian military to overthrow the Mossadeq regime and return the Shah [the former ruler who would be friendly to British oil interests] to power, in the hopes of securing a friendly ally in this important region. The Shah returns to power.

1954:

- Dispute over control of the oil industry is resolved, with the creation of the Iranian National Oil Company, which took over the industry.

1979:

- Iranian Revolution, or Islamic Revolution of Iran, overthrows the Shah that had supported western interests and instates a theocratic nationalist government that sought to remove western influence from the nation.

CWA 2.5 – The President's Daily Bulletin (Iran)



Iranian soldiers surround the Parliament building in Tehran. Presumably August 19, 1953. CHN Archives of Iran's Cultural Heritage Organization. Source: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:28mordad1332.jpg>

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Iran)



Iranian Prime Minister
Mohammed Mussedegh
(Mossedeq) being greeted by US
Secretary of State Dean
Acheson, circa 1951. Source:
Harry S. Truman Presidential
Museum and Library, National
Archives. Accession number 66-
8005,
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/photographs/displayimage.php?photo_id=3229

CWA 2.5 – The President's Daily Bulletin (Iran)

Pro-Mossadeq
Demonstration.
1951-53.
Photographer:
Nasser-Sadeghi.
Source:
[http://commons.wi
kimedia.org/wiki/Fil
e:Pro-mossadeq-
demonst-2.jpg](http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pro-mossadeq-demonst-2.jpg).



CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Iran)



Pro-Mossadeq
Demonstration in
Tehran, 1952.
Photographer:
unknown. Source:
[http://commons.wi
kimedia.org/wiki/Fil
e:Pro-mosadeq-
1952.jpg](http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pro-mosadeq-1952.jpg)

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Iran)

Photograph of President Harry Truman with the Shah of Iran in the Oval Office, ca., 11/18/1949.

Photographer: Abbie Rowe. Source: National Archives, ARC Identifier 200151:

<http://arcweb.archives.gov/action/ExternalIdSearch?id=2001511952.jpg>



CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Iran, TPAJAX, page 1 of 8)

Editors note: The outline that follows details a secret CIA and SIS plot to overthrow Iranian leader Mohammed Mossadeq, called TPAJAX. The document has been excerpted here. To read the full text, visit the NSA Archive at George Washington University, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/>.

Terms:

“CIA” = US Central Intelligence Agency

“Coups” = also known as a coup d’état, overthrow of a government

“Henderson” = Loy W. Henderson, American ambassador to Iran, 1951-54


“Majlis” = lower house of Iranian Parliament

“Shah” = Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Shah (King) of Iran, 1941 – 1979

“SIS” = British Secret Intelligence Service, also known as MI6 (Military Intelligence, Section 6)

“Tudeh” = Iranian communist party

“Zahedi” = Fazlollah Zahedi, an Iranian General who was appointed by the Shah of Iran as prime minister after Mossadeq was deposed.



S E C R E T

SUMMARY OF PRELIMINARY PLAN PREPARED BY
SIS AND CIA REPRESENTATIVES IN CYPRUSI. Preliminary ActionA. Interim Financing of Opposition

1. CIA will supply \$35,000 to Zahedi.
2. SIS will supply \$25,000 to Zahedi.
3. SIS indigenous channels Iran will be used to supply above funds to Zahedi.
4. CIA will attempt subsidize key military leaders if this necessary.

B. Acquisition Shah Cooperation

1. Stage 1: Convince the Shah that UK and US have joint aim and remove pathological fear of British intrigues against him.
 - a. Ambassador Henderson call on the Shah to assure him of US-UK common aid and British supporting him not Mossadeq.
 - b. Henderson to say to the Shah that special US representative will soon be introduced to him for presentation joint US-UK plan.
2. Stage 2: Special US representative will visit the Shah and present following:

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

a. Presentation to the Shah

- (1) Both governments consider oil question secondary.
- (2) Major issue is to maintain independence Iran and keep from the Soviet orbit. To do this Mossadeq must be removed.
- (3) Present dynasty best bulwark national sovereignty.
- (4) While Mossadeq in power no aid for Iran from United States.
- (5) Mossadeq must go.
- (6) US-UK financial aid will be forthcoming to successor government.
- (7) Acceptable oil settlement will be offered but successor government will not be rushed into it.

b. Demands on the Shah

- (1) You must take leadership in overthrow Mossadeq.
- (2) If not, you bear responsibility for collapse of country.

2

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

- (3) If not, Shah's dynasty will fall and US-UK backing of you will cease.
- (4) Who do you want to head successor government? (Try and maneuver Shah into naming Zahedi.)
- (5) Warning not to discuss approach.
- (6) Plan of operation with Zahedi will be discussed with you.

II. Arrangement with Zahedi

- A. After agreement with Shah per above, inform Zahedi he chosen to head successor government with US-UK support.
- B. Agree on specific plan for action and timetable for action. There are two ways to put Zahedi in office.
 - 1. Quasi-legally, whereby the Shah names Zahedi Prime Minister by royal firman.
 - 2. Military coup.

Quasi-legal method to be tried first. If successful at least part of machinery for military coup will be brought into action. If it fails, military coup will follow in matter of hours.

3

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

III. Relations with Majlis

Important for quasi-legal effort. To prepare for such effort deputies must be purchased.

- A. Basic aim is to secure 41 votes against Mossadeq and assure quorum for quasi-legal move by being able to depend on 53 deputies in Majlis. (SIS considers 20 deputies now not controlled must be purchased.)
- B. Approach to deputies to be done by SIS indigenous agent group. CIA will backstop where necessary by pressures on Majlis deputies and will provide part of the funds.

IV. Relations with Religious Leaders

Religious leaders should:

- A. Spread word of their disapproval Mossadeq.
- B. As required, stage political demonstrations under religious cover.
- C. Reinforce backbone of the Shah.
- D. Make strong assurances over radio and in mosques after coup that new government faithful Moslem principles.

4

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Possibly as quid pro quo prominent cleric Borujerdi would be offered ministry without portfolio or consider implementing neglected article constitution providing body five ✓ mullas (religious leaders) to pass on orthodoxy of legislation.

E.

should be encouraged to threaten direct action against pro-Mossadeq deputies.

V. Relations with Bazaar

Bazaar contacts to be used to spread anti-government rumors and possibly close bazaar as anti-government expression.

VI. Tudeh

Zahedi must expect violent reaction from Tudeh and be prepared to meet with superior violence.

- A. Arrest at least 100 Party and Front Group leaders.
- B. Seal off South Tehran to prevent influx Tudeh demonstrations.

5

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

C. Via black leaflets direct Tudeh members not to take any action.

VII. Press and Propaganda Program

- A. Prior coup intensify anti-Mossadeq propaganda.
- B. Zahedi should quickly appoint effective chief of government press and propaganda who will:
 - 1. Brief all foreign correspondents.
 - 2. Release advance prepared US and UK official statements.
 - 3. Make maximum use Radio Tehran.

VIII. Relations with Tribes

- A. Coup will provoke no action from Bakhtiari, Lurs, Kurds, Baluchi, Zolfaghari, Mamassani, Boer Ahmadi, and Khamseh tribal groups.
- B. Major problem is neutralization of Qashqa'i tribal leaders.

IX. Mechanics of Quasi-Legal Overthrow

- A. At this moment the view with most favor is the so-called _____ plan" - whereby mass demonstrators seek religious refuge

6

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

C. Religious refuge to take place at the dawn of the coup day. Immediately followed by effort have Majlis pass a motion to censure the government. This is to be followed by the dismissal of Mossadeq and the appointment of Zahedi as successor. If successful, the coup would be completed by early afternoon. Failing success, the coup would be mounted later that evening.

8

S E C R E T

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Iran, NSC 136, page 1 of 4)

DECLASSIFIED		INSTRUCTIONS	
Authority <u>ND 959285</u>			
By <u>WDI</u> NARA Date <u>2/29/00</u>			
NSC 136/1		COPY NO. <u>47</u>	

A REPORT
TO THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
 by
 THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
 on
 UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING THE PRESENT SITUATION IN IRAN

November 20, 1952

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

CWA 2.5 – The President's Daily Bulletin (Iran, NSC 136, page 2 of 4)

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATIONSTATEMENT OF POLICY
Proposed by the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

THE PRESENT SITUATION IN IRAN

1. It is of critical importance to the United States that Iran remain an independent and sovereign nation, not dominated by the USSR. Because of its key strategic position, its petroleum resources, its vulnerability to intervention or armed attack by the USSR, and its vulnerability to political subversion, Iran must be regarded as a continuing objective of Soviet expansion. The loss of Iran by default or by Soviet intervention would:

a. Be a major threat to the security of the entire Middle East, including Pakistan and India.

b. Permit communist denial to the free world of access to Iranian oil and seriously threaten the loss of other Middle Eastern oil.

c. Increase the Soviet Union's capability to threaten important United States-United Kingdom lines of communication.

d. Damage United States prestige in nearby countries and with the exception of Turkey and possibly Pakistan, seriously weaken, if not destroy, their will to resist communist pressures.

e. Set off a series of military, political and economic developments, the consequences of which would seriously endanger the security interests of the United States.

2. Present trends in Iran are unfavorable to the maintenance of control by a non-communist regime for an extended period of time. In wresting the political initiative from the Shah, the landlords, and other traditional holders of power, the National Front politicians now in power have at least temporarily eliminated every alternative to their own rule except the Communist Tudeh Party. However, the ability of the National Front to maintain control of the situation indefinitely is uncertain. The political upheaval which brought the nationalists to power has heightened popular desire for promised economic and social betterment and has increased

NSC 136/1

- 1 -

BY WDP
DATE 2/29/60
AUTHORITY WDP 95-2285

TOP SECRET

CWA 2.5 – The President's Daily Bulletin (Iran, NSC 136, page 3 of 4)

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

social unrest. At the same time, nationalist failure to re-store the oil industry to operation has led to near-exhaustion of the government's financial reserves and to deficit financing to meet current expenses, and is likely to produce a progressive deterioration of the economy at large.

3. It is now estimated that communist forces will probably not gain control of the Iranian government during 1953*. Nevertheless, the Iranian situation contains very great elements of instability. Any US policy regarding Iran must accordingly take into account the danger that the communists might be enabled to gain the ascendancy as a result of such possible developments as a struggle for power within the National Front, more effective communist infiltration of the government than now appears probable, government failure to maintain the security forces and to take effective action against communist activity, or a major crop failure. It is clear that the United Kingdom no longer possesses the capability unilaterally to assure stability in the area. If present trends continue unchecked, Iran could be effectively lost to the free world in advance of an actual Communist takeover of the Iranian Government. Failure to arrest present trends in Iran involves a serious risk to the national security of the United States.

4. For the reasons outlined above, the major United States policy objective with respect to Iran is to prevent the country from coming under communist control. The United States should, therefore, be prepared to pursue the policies which would be most effective in accomplishing this objective. In the light of the present situation the United States should adopt and pursue the following policies:

a. Continue to assist in every practicable way to effect an early and equitable liquidation of the oil controversy.


b. Be prepared to take the necessary measures to help Iran to start up her oil industry and to secure markets for her oil so that Iran may benefit from substantial oil revenues.

c. Be prepared to provide prompt United States budgetary aid to Iran if, pending restoration of her oil industry and oil markets, such aid is necessary to halt a serious deterioration of the financial and political situation in Iran.

*See NIE-75, "Probable Developments in Iran Through 1953," published November 13, 1952.

NSC 136/1

- 2 -



CWA 2.5 – The President's Daily Bulletin (Iran, NSC 136, page 4 of 4)

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

7. In the event of a Soviet attack by organized USSR military forces against Iran, the United States in common prudence would have to proceed on the assumption that global war is probably imminent. Accordingly, the United States should then immediately:

a. Decide in the light of the circumstances existing at the time whether to attempt to localize the action or to treat it as a casus belli. In either case necessary measures should include direct diplomatic action and resort to the United Nations with the objectives of:

(1) Making clear to the world the aggressive character of the Soviet action.

(2) Making clear to the world United States preference for a peaceful solution and the conditions upon which the United States would, in concert with other members of the United Nations, accept such a settlement.

(3) Obtaining the authorization of the United Nations for member nations to take appropriate action in the name of the United Nations to assist Iran.

b. Consider a direct approach to the highest Soviet leaders.

c. Place itself in the best possible position to meet the increased threat of global war.

d. Consult with selected allies to perfect coordinated plans.

e. Take action against the aggressor to the extent and in the manner which would best contribute to the security of the United States.

f. Prepare to maintain, if necessary, an Iranian Government-in-exile.

NSC 136/1

- 5 -

By WDP
Date 2/29/60
Authority NND 959285

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CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Iran, Map of Iran)

Source: The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html>



CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Guatemala)

Timeline

1931:

- Jorge Ubico is elected president of Guatemala. A dictator and fascist, Ubico protects and promote the interests of American businesses and the American military. The largest US business was the United Fruit Company; Ubico gave them large plots of public land and exempted them from paying taxes.

1944-1949:

- Ubico resigns from office after a general strike and popular uprising. Although Ubico was no longer in power, the new leader, General Federico Ponce Vaides, took his orders from the former dictator.
- Popular uprisings continue, resulting in the October Revolution of 1944, which brings to power a junta led by Colonel Jacobo Árbenz Guzman Bermejo (hereafter referred to as Árbenz), Major Francisco Javier Arana, and a lawyer Jorge Toriello, who promised elections by the end of the year.
- Juan José Arévalo elected president, with 85% of the vote. Arévalo makes some changes, but they are not enough for the rural poor and American business and military interests. Coups are attempted.
- Árbenz is appointed as Minister of Defense, which limits Arana’s power.

1950:

- Árbenz is elected President of Guatemala, winning in a landslide.
- Once in office, Arbenz encourages workers to organize into labor unions; Communist influence grows in labor unions and among peasant groups, as well as in Árbenz’ government. United Fruit Company warns US government of growing communist influence.

1952:


- Árbenz signs an agrarian reform bill, Decree 900, which redistributes land ownership by taking unfarmed land from any estate (owned by both individual families and businesses) more than 672 acres in size and distributing it to individual families. The government paid the original land owners the amount of money the property was worth, according to the 1952 tax assessments. The program ran for 18 months, redistributing 1,500,000 acres to 100,000 families. Under the new law, 71% of the land owned by American-owned United Fruit Company was scheduled to be re-distributed.

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Guatemala)

Timeline (cont.)

1953-54:

- The Guatemalan Supreme Court rules Decree 90 unconstitutional. The Guatemalan Congress, with Árbenz’ encouragement, impeaches the judges.
- President Eisenhower becomes increasingly convinced that Árbenz is sympathetic to Communists in the Soviet Union. Eisenhower authorizes the CIA to isolate, weaken, and ultimately force Árbenz out of office. Code-named PBSUCCESS, the plot includes the secret invasion of exiled Guatemalans, led by Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, who took power after the successful coup d’état. Armas restores American property rights and ends other Árbenz reforms.



[Dwight D. Eisenhower, three-quarter length portrait, seated, facing front] / Fabian Bachrach, photographer, c. 1952. Source: Library of Congress, <http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/93511989/>

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Guatemala)

Editor’s Note: The following excerpt is from the Statement of John C. Drier, US government representative speaking about Communist threat in Guatemala, August 1954. Source: US Department of State. “The Guatemalan Problem before the OAS Council.” In *Intervention of International Communism in Guatemala*. Department of State Publication 5556, Inter-American Series 48. Released August 1954, pp. 25-30. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1954.



John Foster Dulles speaking at microphone, 1958.
(Dulles served as US Secretary of State from 1953-1958.) Warren Leffler, photographer.
Source: Library of Congress,
<http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2011660831/>

“The Republics of America are faced at this time with a serious threat to their peace and independence. Throughout the world the aggressive forces of Soviet Communist imperialism are exerting a relentless pressure upon all free nations. Since 1939, 15 once free nations have fallen prey to the forces directed by the Kremlin. Hundreds of millions of people in Europe and Asia have been pressed into the slavery of the Communist totalitarian state. Subversion, civil violence, and open warfare are the proven methods of this aggressive force in its ruthless striving for world domination....

There is no doubt... that it is the declared policy of the American States that the establishment of a government dominated by the international Communist movement in America would constitute a grave danger to all our American Republics and that steps must be taken to prevent any such eventuality....”

“It is the international Communist organization controlled in the Kremlin which has created the present danger... We are confident that the international Communist movement holds no real appeal for the peoples of America and can only subdue them if allowed to pursue its violent and deceitful methods unchecked. Having read the tragic history of other nations seduced by Communist promises into a slavery from which they later could not escape, we wish to leave no stone unturned, no effort unexerted, to prevent the complete subordination of one of our member states to Soviet Communist imperialism. For when one state has fallen history shows that another will soon come under attack.”

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Guatemala)

Source: The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gt.html>



CWA 2.5 – The President's Daily Bulletin (Guatemala, CIA Analysis)

Editor's note: the date of the following CIA analysis of the "Present Situation in Guatemala" is unclear because scanning cut off the right margin of the document, but is estimated to be sometime between 1951 and 1954. It was declassified in 2006. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Freedom of Information Act electronic reading room collection, http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/5829/CIA-RDP80R01731R001700140004-9.pdf.

Approved For Release 2006/12/08 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001700140004-9
 3 Apr 54
 Recd 15 Apr 54

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SECURITY INFORMATION

GUATEMALA

Present situation:

Government:

- Congress** - dominated by the Communist Party and "Frentes Populares": Partido Accion Revolucionaria (PAR), Renovacion Nacional (RN), Frente Popular Libertador (FPL), and Partido Socialista (PS). 48 of the 64 deputies in Congress belong to these parties. Roberto ALVARADO Fuentes, outgoing president of the PAR, attended several Communist meetings held in Guatemala and abroad, having been in Moscow and the satellite countries. The incumbent President, Lic. ESTUADA de la Hoz, (PAR), like his predecessor, is Communist. Dr. AREVALO, ex-president of the Republic, is the leader of this party, although the PAR and the Communist Party (PC) are directed by Soviet agents.
- The extraordinary committees of the Congress are headed and controlled by the PC and the PAR: Agrarian reform, headed by Professor Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ, head of the Partido Revolucionario Obrero (PRO) which just combined with the PC. The committee consists of 9 members, 7 of whom can be said to belong to this party. GUTIERREZ is the author of a proposed "democratic" agrarian law which would practically eliminate private property.
- Committee for the Reform of the labor code, controlled and headed by communists. Among the reforms being considered are the syndical clauses: "Preferential", "admission" and "exclusion". By means of these, political or revolutionary syndicalism (red) would be imposed on the country, controlling the greater part, if not all, of the city and country workers, the PC thereby having electoral control and an easy means to control all the State organisms. It should be noted that the President of the Republic and the deputies are elected by the people; the President appoints the Ministers and all the officials and employees of the Public Administration; the Congress chooses the Judges of the Supreme Court, the magistrates (chief justices) of the Court of Appeals and of the Civil Courts; the Supreme Court names all the judges, of the courts of first review, labor, and peace.
- Committee to Revise Administrative Contracts: This committee is concerned with the revision of the contracts of American companies, bi-lateral contracts to which the State is a party (bi-lateral contracts cannot be revised by one of the contracting parties).

Executive:

- President ARBENZ owes the presidency to Dr. AREVALO and to the labor unions lead by Communists, which were organized as political parties. He was also helped by the "Popular Fronts". He has made promises to

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 Approved For Release 2006/12/08 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001700140004-9

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Guatemala)

Editor’s Note: the following excerpt is taken from an interview with Luis Cardoza y Aragon, Guatemala’s defense minister under President Arbenz. Source: Luis Cardoza y Aragon, “Interview: The Revolution of ’44-54: A Reappraisal.” In *Guatemala*, eds. Susanne Jonas and David Tobis. Copyright 1974 by the North American Congress on Latin America, 475 Riverside Dr., 454 New York, N.Y. 10115-0122.

With respect to my Guatemala, the key factor, decisively and definitely, is summed up totally in *North American Imperialism*.... It was civil progress rather than revolution... that commenced with Arevalo and his labor laws, social security, something (not much) in education, public health...

The formation of the PGT [Guatemalan Labor Party, i.e., Communist Party] leadership was itself improvised, made up of manual workers; the truth is, there were no communists among them....

And even if there had been a real Communist Party, or if Arbenz’ government had been communist (both impossible in 1944-54), they would never have posed the least threat to the United States. Apart from the right of a people to have the government it wishes, etc., the fact is that Arbenz’ government was a soft nationalist model (none of the laws, including the agrarian reform, were more than moderate). But to people like Nixon and McCarthy, it was still a bad example on the continent. The US (North American imperialism) squashed a little butterfly that wished to fly a little more freely within the capitalist system, and to emerge from a barbaric, inhumane situation to better living conditions for its people, of all classes....

Keep in mind what sort of beasts Dulles and Eisenhower had to be to destroy a stammer of freedom in a very small, very backward country, which in no way could endanger anyone. That bestiality has to be seen in the clearest perspective, above all else....

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Guatemala)

Editor’s Note: the following excerpt is from George F. Kennan, “Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department (Kennan) to the Secretary of State,” March, 1950 US Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, 2: The United Nations, the Western Hemisphere*, “Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department (Kennan) to the Secretary of State,” 29 March 1950, pp. 598-624. Washington, D.,C.: GPO, 1976.

...Our relationship to Latin America occupies a vitally important place in our effort to achieve, within the non-communist world in general, a system of international relationships, political and economic, reasonably adequate to the demands of this post-war era, and henceforth qualified to serve as a rebuttal of the Russian challenge to our right to exist as a great and leading world power....

The military significance to us of the Latin American countries lies today rather in the extent to which we may be dependent upon them for materials essential to the prosecution of a war, and more importantly in the extent to which the attitudes of the Latin American peoples may influence the general political trend in the international community....

It seems to me unlikely that there could be any other region of the earth in which nature and human behavior could have combined to produce a more unhappy and hopeless background for the conduct of human life than in Latin America.

As for nature, one is struck at once with the way in which South America is the reverse of our own North American continent from the standpoint of its merits as a human habitat....

It is true that most of the people who go by the name of “communist” in Latin America are somewhat different species than in Europe. Their bond with MosCWA is tenuous and indirect.... Many of them are little aware of its reality. For this reason... they sometimes have little resemblance to the highly disciplined communists of Europe, and are less conscious of their status as the tools of MosCWA. The MosCWA leaders, we may be sure, must view them with a mixture of amusement, contempt, and anxiety....

Our problem then, is to create, where such do not already exist, incentives which will impel the governments and societies of the Latin American countries to resist communist pressures, and to assist them and spur them on in their efforts, where the incentives are already present....

[A]s of today, the protection of US investments in Latin America rests predominantly on the self-interest of the governing groups in the Latin American countries and on the ability of the American owners to enlist that self-interest through the judicious use of their financial power, where it does not exist from other causes. In many instances, bribery may be said to have replaced diplomatic intervention as the main protection of private capital; and the best sanction of its continued operation lies in the corruptibility, rather than the enlightenment of the local regimes...

CWA 2.5 – The President's Daily Bulletin (Guatemala, CIA to Dept. of Defense)

Editor's note: The following 1953 CIA memo to the Department of Defense was declassified in 2003. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Freedom of Information Act electronic reading room collection,
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000914747.pdf

~~CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM~~
~~RELEASE IN FULL~~
~~SECRET~~
Security Information

**2003
EYES ONLY**

22 October 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: General G. B. Erskine, USMC
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Room 3D928, The Pentagon
Washington, D. C.

SUBJECT: Guatemala

1. Pursuant to the conversation of 15 October, between the undersigned and General Erskine, the following Guatemalan background data is forwarded.
2. During the past few years Guatemala has become the leading base of operations for Moscow-influenced Communism in Central America.
3. Ruled by powerful, anti-US President Arbenz, supported by a leftist coalition government, with all key positions below cabinet level thoroughly controlled by a Communist-dominated bureaucracy, Guatemala now represents a serious threat to hemispheric solidarity and to our security in the Caribbean area.
4. Essentially a primitive, rural country the size of Louisiana, with a population of 3½ million, Guatemala is currently engaged in an intensely nationalistic program of progress colored by the touchy, anti-foreign inferiority complex of the "Banana Republic."
5. With labor to a large degree organized according to Communist methods, and a land reform plan benefiting the peasantry, the present Arbenz government commands substantial popular support in spite of evidence of opposition in the capital, Guatemala City (population 180,000).
6. With an Army of 7,000, the well-trained and quite well-equipped hard core of which is stationed in the capital city, Guatemala maintains the balance of military power in Central America. This, coupled with Communist subversive activities extending across the Guatemalan borders, is a matter of increasing concern to nearby States, including Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador.

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CWA 2.5 – The President's Daily Bulletin (Guatemala, CIA to Dept. of Defense)

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Security Information

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7. The disturbing and subversive influence of Communist-dominated Guatemala within the Pan-American orbit, as well as an aggressively hardening anti-US policy targeted directly against American interests in the country, has recently caused the United States Government to adopt a somewhat firmer attitude towards Guatemala than heretofore.

8. It has been determined at the competent policy level of the Government that in order to isolate the target country (Guatemala), and strengthen the neighboring countries which are most immediately threatened, military aid agreements of some dimension (unspecified, although presumably quite modest) should be concluded with Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador. Implementation of such aid programs should be expedited on a priority basis and US military missions should proceed to the countries in question to supervise deliveries of military equipment and offer technical assistance. Negotiations with Nicaragua are progressing. Preliminary steps to encourage Honduras to follow suit are in progress, and El Salvador is expected to request assistance as soon as it becomes known that the others are scheduled to receive aid.

SIGNED

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

WH/OMD/pw 16 Oct. 1953
Rewritten: DD/P-FGW/bjm 10/22/53
Orig. and 1 to addressee
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Security Information

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Hungary)

Timeline

WWII (1939-45)

- In 1940, Hungary joined Germany, Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, and Japan as part of the Axis fighting the Allies.
- In 1945, German and Hungarian forces defeated by invading Soviet forces.

1945

- Soviet army occupies Hungary.
- The Hungarian Communist Party gains control of government.
- The Communist Party expands its control through the Hungarian State Security Police, or ÁVH. The ÁVH used intimidation, imprisonment, and torture to oppress its opponents and the Hungarian people.

1949

- The country is renamed the People’s Republic of Hungary to highlight its Communist identity.
- Hungary signs an economic treaty with the Soviet Union, the ComEcon, which provides for economic cooperation, and gives the USSR access to internal Hungarian politics.

1950-52

- The ÁVH relocates thousands of people to take their property and housing for members of the communist leadership and to quell discontent of intellectuals and elites. Many of those relocated were arrested, tortured, imprisoned, or executed.
- Mátyás Rákosi, General Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party launches Five-Year Plans, based upon Stalin’s Soviet model, to rapidly industrialize Hungary’s economy and agriculture. This effort failed in part because many Hungarian resources were shipped to the Soviet Union.
- The Hungarian standard of living falls during this period; food is rationed.

1953

- On March 3, Stalin dies. Many communist countries in the Soviet sphere begin moderate reforms.
- Imre Nagy, a reformer, replaces Rákosi, but Rákosi stays on as General Secretary, able to limit many of Nagy’s reforms.

1955

- On May 14, the Soviet Union creates Warsaw Pact. An expansion of ComEcon’s economic alliance, the Warsaw Pact serves as a military and political alliance between the Soviet Union and its satellites in

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Hungary)

Timeline (continued)

Central and Eastern Europe. The Warsaw Pact is created in response to West Germany’s inclusion in NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the American-led military alliance formed in 1954 that also included Great Britain, France, Canada, and other western European countries.

1956

- In February, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev gives a “secret speech,” denouncing Stalin’s harsh reign as Soviet leader.
- On July 18, Rákosi is replaced by Ernő Gerő.
- In the summer of 1956, students and journalists hold a series of public meetings to seek reforms.

October 23, 1956

- A crowd of 200,000 largely peaceful protestors meet next to the statue of József Bem, a national hero.
- Gerő condemns protest, but rebellion grows, later bringing down a statue of Stalin. The ÁVH first uses tear gas, and then shoots some protestors, who respond violently.
- Gerő asks for Soviet intervention to support Hungarian government.

October 24 - 28, 1956

- Soviet tanks and troops enter Budapest and clash with protestors.
- Hungarian government collapses; Gerő flees to the Soviet Union.
- Imre Nagy becomes Prime Minister and calls for an end to violence and further political reform.

October 28 – 31

- Fighting reduces after a agreement is achieved on October 28; Soviet military begins withdrawal.

November 1

- Nagy makes radio address declaring Hungary’s neutrality and withdraws from the Warsaw Pact.
- Nagy releases many political prisoners and allows previously banned political parties to return.

November 4

- Soviet tanks return to Budapest to crush Hungarian uprising.
- Nagy asks anti-communist western powers for help; the international community doesn’t respond, although US Secretary of State Dulles calls for a meeting of the United Nations’ Security Council.
- Nagy is captured by Soviet troops and executed two years later.
- Thousands of Hungarians are arrested, imprisoned, and hundreds executed for the rebellion.

CWA 2.5 – The President's Daily Bulletin (Hungary)

A Soviet tank attempts to clear a road barricade in Budapest, Hungary. October 1956. Source: Central Intelligence Agency booklet "CIA Analysis of the Warsaw Pact Forces: The Importance of Clandestine Reporting," www.cia.gov/library/publications/historical-collection-publications.



CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Hungary, Clandestine Services History)

Editor’s Note: the following Clandestine Services History document was written in 1958, as a CIA-review of its intelligence collection activities during the Hungarian uprising of 1956. It was declassified in 2005, but some sections of the document remain redacted, purposely hidden for national security reasons. The redacted document, in its entirety, can be found at the National Security Archives at George Washington University,

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB206/CSH_Hungarian_Revolution_Vol1.pdf.

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CS Historical Paper
No. 6

CLANDESTINE SERVICES HISTORY

THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION
AND
PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE
23 October - 4 November 1956

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2005

VOLUME I OF II

Controlled by: SB ☐
Date prepared: January 1958
Written by:

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CWA 2.5 – The President's Daily Bulletin (Hungary, Clandestine Services History)

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III - 18

the lack of unified leadership in the revolution, debated whether the Soviets would or would not interfere with what was going on in Hungary, stated that the revolution was losing momentum, that Imre Nagy was discredited as a future leader and proposed that a national leader must come forth around whom the whole revolutionary movement and its gains could be solidified. [] warily suggested that [] might be the right man and raised the question of getting in touch with him. [] further pointed out that the Northern Hungarian border cities represented a more or less unified bloc in their demands and in their disagreements with Budapest, but were not really unified otherwise (i.e. organizationally).

[By this date (31 October) Imre Nagy had publicly announced the formation of a cabinet to include the leaders of the most prominent outlawed Hungarian political parties, and each of these leaders had already (30 October) spoken over the Budapest radio to announce the re-formation of his party: Tildy (Smallholders), Erdei (Peasants). Bela Kovacs did not speak on the radio but was interviewed by a reporter in Pecs, which was written up in the Hungarian papers on 31 October. By this time also the news had come out in Budapest that Hegedus and not Imre Nagy had called in the Russians the first time, and that Nagy was daily gaining in stature and was acceding in giant steps to the increasingly radical demands of the various councils and committees who were sending representatives to him. Mindszenty had been released and had already made a public statement. At the same time the first ominous-sounding reports of the apparent re-entry of fresh Soviet troops on Hungarian soil were being received.]

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CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Hungary, 16 Points)

Editor’s Note: The United Nations published this resolution, written by Hungarian students in 1956, the *Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary*, UN General Assembly, Official Records: Eleventh Session, Supplement No. 18 (A/3592). The copy below was secured from the World History Sourcebook, <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1956hungary-16points.html>.

Sixteen Political, Economic, and Ideological Points, Budapest, October 22, 1956

RESOLUTION ADOPTED AT PLENARY MEETING OF THE BUILDING INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY UNIVERSITY'

Students of Budapest!

The following resolution was born on 22 October 1956, at the dawn of a new period in Hungarian history, in the Hall of the Building Industry Technological University as a result of the spontaneous movement of several thousand of the Hungarian youth who love their Fatherland:

- (1) We demand the immediate withdrawal of all Soviet troops in accordance with the provisions of the Peace Treaty.
- (2) We demand the election of new leaders in the Hungarian Workers' Party on the low, medium and high levels by secret ballot from the ranks upwards. These leaders should convene the Party Congress within the shortest possible time and should elect a new central body of leaders.
- (3) The Government should be reconstituted under the leadership of Comrade Imre Nagy; all criminal leaders of the Stalinist-Rdkosi era should be relieved of their posts at once.
- (4) We demand a public trial in the criminal case of Milidly Farkas and his accomplices. Mdtys Rdkosi, who is primarily responsible for all the crimes of the recent past and for the ruin of this country, should be brought home and brought before a People's Court of judgment.
- (5) We demand general elections in this country, with universal suffrage, secret ballot and the participation of several Parties for the purpose of electing a new National Assembly. We demand that the workers should have the right to strike.
- (6) We demand a re-examination and re-adjustment of Hungarian-Soviet and Hungarian-Yugoslav political, economic and intellectual relations on the basis of complete political and economic equality and of non~intervention in each other's internal affairs.
- (7) We demand the re-organization of the entire economic life of Hungary, with the assistance of specialists. Our whole economic system based on planned economy should be re-examined with an eye to Hungarian conditions and to the vital interests of the Hungarian people.
- (8) Our foreign trade agreements and the real figures in respect of reparations that can never be paid should be made public. We demand frank and sincere information concerning the country's uranium deposits, their

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Hungary, 16 Points)

exploitation and the Russian concession. We demand that Hungary should have the right to sell the uranium ore freely at world market prices in exchange for hard currency.

(9) We demand the complete revision of norms in industry and an urgent and radical adjustment of wages to meet the demands of workers and intellectuals. We demand that minimum living wages for workers should be fixed.

(10) We demand that the delivery system should be placed on a new basis and that produce should be used rationally. We demand equal treatment of peasants farming individually.

(11) We demand the re-examination of all political and economic trials by independent courts and the release and rehabilitation of innocent persons. We demand the immediate repatriation of prisoners-of-war and of civilians deported to the Soviet Union, including prisoners who have been condemned beyond the frontiers of Hungary.

(12) We demand complete freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of the Press and a free Radio, as well as a new daily newspaper of large circulation for the MEFESZ [League of Hungarian University and College Student Associations] organization. We demand that the existing 'screening material' should be made public and destroyed.

(13) We demand that the Stalin statue-the symbol of Stalinist tyranny and political oppression-should be removed as quickly as possible and that a memorial worthy of the freedom fighters and martyrs of 1848-49 should be erected on its site.

(14) In place of the existing coat of arms, which is foreign to the Hungarian people, we wish the re-introduction of the old Hungarian Kossuth arms. We demand for the Hungarian Army new uniforms worthy of our national traditions. We demand that 15 March should be a national holiday and a non~working day and that 6 October should be a day of national mourning and a school holiday..

(15) The youth of the Technological University of Budapest unanimously express their complete solidarity with the Polish and Warsaw workers and youth in connexion with the Polish national independence movement.

(16) The students of the Building Industry Technological University will organize local units of MEFESZ as quickly as possible, and have resolved to convene a Youth Parliament in Budapest for the 27th of this month (Saturday) at which the entire youth of this country will be represented by their delegates. The students of the Technological University and of the various other Universities will gather in the Gorkij Faszor before the Writers' Union Headquarters tomorrow, the 23rd. of this month, at 2.30 P.m., whence they will proceed to the Pálffy Tér (Bern Ter) to the Bern statue, on which they will lay wreaths in sign of their sympathy with the Polish freedom movement. The workers of the factories are invited to join in this procession.

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Hungary)

Editor’s Note: The following statement by the Soviet Union was first published in the Department of State Bulletin, November 12, 1956. The excerpt below was secured from the World History Sourcebook, <http://www.fordham.edu/Halsall/mod/1956hungary.asp>.

Statement of the Soviet Government, October 30, 1956

The Soviet Government regards it as indispensable to make a statement in connection with the events in Hungary. The course of the events has shown that the working people of Hungary, who have achieved great progress on the basis of their people's democratic order, correctly raise the question of the necessity of eliminating serious shortcomings in the field of economic building, the further raising of the material well-being of the population, and the struggle against bureaucratic excesses in the state apparatus. However, this just and progressive movement of the working people was soon joined by forces of black reaction and counterrevolution, which are trying to take advantage of the discontent of part of the working people to undermine the foundations of the people's democratic order in Hungary and to restore the old landlord and capitalist order. The Soviet Government and all the Soviet people deeply regret that the development of events in Hungary has led to bloodshed. On the request of the Hungarian People's Government the Soviet Government consented to the entry into Budapest of the Soviet Army units to assist the Hungarian People's Army and the Hungarian authorities to establish order in the town. Believing that the further presence of Soviet Army units in Hungary can serve as a cause for even greater deterioration of the situation, the Soviet Government has given instructions to its military command to withdraw the Soviet Army units from Budapest as soon as this is recognized as necessary by the Hungarian Government. At the same time, the Soviet Government is ready to enter into relevant negotiations with the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic and other participants of the Warsaw Treaty on the question of the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Hungary.

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Hungary)

Editor’s Note: The following statement by Hungarian leader Imre Nagy aired November 4, 1956 on Hungarian Radio and first was published in the Department of State Bulletin, November 12, 1946. The excerpt below was secured from the World History Sourcebook, <http://www.fordham.edu/Halsall/mod/1956hungary.asp>.

This fight is the fight for freedom by the Hungarian people against the Russian intervention, and it is possible that I shall only be able to stay at my post for one or two hours. The whole world will see how the Russian armed forces, contrary to all treaties and conventions, are crushing the resistance of the Hungarian people. They will also see how they are kidnapping the Prime Minister of a country which is a Member of the United Nations, taking him from the capital, and therefore it cannot be doubted at all that this is the most brutal form of intervention. I should like in these last moments to ask the leaders of the revolution, if they can, to leave the country. I ask that all that I have said in my broadcast, and what we have agreed on with the revolutionary leaders during meetings in Parliament, should be put in a memorandum, and the leaders should turn to all the peoples of the world for help and explain that today it is Hungary and tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow, it will be the turn of other countries because the imperialism of MosCWA does not know borders, and is only trying to play for time.

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Hungary, Soviet Statement)

Editor’s Note: The following statement by the Soviet Union was first published in the Department of State Bulletin, November 12, 1956. The excerpt below was secured from the World History Sourcebook, <http://www.fordham.edu/Halsall/mod/1956soviet-coop1.asp>.

The principles of peaceful coexistence, friendship, and cooperation among all states have always been and still form the unshakable foundation of the foreign relations of the U.S.S.R... United by the common ideal of building a socialist society and the principles of proletarian internationalism, the countries of the great commonwealth of socialist nations can build their relations only on the principle of full equality, respect of territorial integrity, state independence and sovereignty, and noninterference in one another's domestic affairs. This does not exclude, but on the contrary presupposes, close fraternal cooperation and mutual aid between the countries of the socialist commonwealth in the economic, political, and cultural spheres. ...

As recent events have shown, the need has arisen for an appropriate declaration to be made on the position of the Soviet Union in the mutual relations between the U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries, primarily in the economic and military spheres....

With a view to insuring the mutual security of the socialist countries, the Soviet Government is ready to examine with other socialist countries that are parties to the Warsaw Treaty the question of Soviet troops stationed on the territory of these countries. In this the Soviet Government proceeds from the general principle that the stationing of troops of one state that is a party to the Warsaw Treaty on the territory of another state that is a party to the Warsaw Treaty should take place on the basis of an agreement among all its participants and not only with the agreement of the state on whose territory these troops are stationed or are planned to be stationed at its request...The Soviet Government and all the Soviet people deeply regret that the development of events in Hungary has led to bloodshed. On the request of the Hungarian People's Government the Soviet Government consented to the entry into Budapest of the Soviet Army units to assist the Hungarian People's Army and the Hungarian authorities to establish order in the town. Believing that the further presence of Soviet Army units in Hungary can serve as a cause for even greater deterioration of the situation, the Soviet Government has given instructions to its military command to withdraw the Soviet Army units from Budapest as soon as this is recognized as necessary by the Hungarian Government.. . .

The Soviet Government expresses confidence that the peoples of the socialist countries will not permit foreign and internal reactionary forces to undermine the basis of the people's democratic regimes, won and consolidated by the heroic struggle and toil of the workers, peasants, and intelligentsia of each country. They will make all efforts to remove all obstacles that lie in the path of further strengthening the democratic basis of the independence and sovereignty of their countries, to develop further the socialist basis of each country, its economy and culture, for the sake of the constant growth of the material welfare and the cultural level of all the workers. They will consolidate the fraternal unity and mutual assistance of the socialist countries for the strengthening of the great cause of peace and socialism.

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Berlin Wall)

Timeline

Post-WWII

- Berlin is divided into four zones at the end of WWII, each controlled by a separate Allied country. Within a couple years, the city is divided into two parts: 1) West Berlin, a free part of West Germany with economic and political support provided by the US, and 2) East Berlin, a communist city controlled by the Soviet Union.
- In 1948, the Soviet Union blockades West Berlin. The US and its allies airlift in medicine and food. In May of 1949, the blockade is lifted.

1949

- The German Democratic Republic (East Germany) is formed, which means that the Soviet Union controls most of its military, politics, and economy. Private property and industry is nationalized (taken over by the government) and a secret police enforces Communist government policy.
- The Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) is created as a democratic free-market government.

1950-1953

- Thousands of East Germans (and other migrants from Eastern Europe) flee to West Germany in order to escape the authoritarian rule of the Soviet system and seek economic opportunities.


1952

- East German leaders meet with Stalin in Moscow, complaining of high rates of emigration to the West and the danger of easy access of the West to East German society and government. Stalin agrees; East Germany’s border with West Germany is strengthened, but the border between East and West Berlin remains open. Thousands flee to the west, reducing the East German working population considerably.

1961


- On August 13, the East German army closed the border with West Berlin. Streets along the border were torn up and barbed wire was installed around the three western sectors of the city of West Berlin.
- A wall is quickly fortified with concrete blocks, chain fences, and mine fields. People who are caught trying to flee to the west were arrested or shot.
- Many families who lived on both sides of the Berlin border were split and those with jobs in the other sector couldn’t get to work.
- On August 19, an American special ambassador and Vice President Lyndon Johnson arrived in West Berlin to show their support for West Berlin. A convoy of western troops paraded through city streets.

Berlin Divided, Post-WWII



CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Berlin Wall)

Berlin Wall, 1961. Toni Frissell, Photographer. Source: Library of Congress, <http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/96506375>.



CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Berlin Wall)

East German troops close the border in preparation for building of the wall. Berlin, Mauerbau, Kampfgruppen am Brandenburger Tor, August 13, 1961, Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-85458-0002 / Junge, Peter Heinz / CC-BY-SA. Source: German Federal Archive. Online Access: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-85458-0002_Berlin_Mauerbau_Kampfgruppen_am_Brandenburger_Tor.jpg/




CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Berlin Wall)

The view of the border between the Soviet and American sectors of Berlin from the western side, October 1961.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency booklet "CIA Analysis of the Warsaw Pact Forces: The Importance of Clandestine Reporting," www.cia.gov/library/publications/historical-collection-publications.



CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Berlin Wall, Dulles Briefing)

Briefing given by Mr. Dulles at the morning and afternoon meeting of Congressional leaders with the President on March 7, 1959. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/16/1959-03-07.pdf.



CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Berlin Wall, 10 Berlin Issues)

Memorandum: 10 Key Berlin Issues Coming Up for Decision, July 7, 1961. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/16/1961-07-07c.pdf.

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July 7, 1961

MEMORANDUM *by Henry Owen.*

SUBJECT: Ten Key Berlin Issues Coming Up for Decision

1. Military Preparations. The Secretary of Defense will report by July 13 on the preparations needed to enhance Western capabilities for an airlift, naval harassment, ground action, and possible use of strategic airpower.

Decisions will be needed soon afterward on which of these suggested preparations are to be initiated in the near future -- so that we can inform and consult our allies before requesting any needed funds and authority from the Congress or taking other public action.

The basic issue will be whether these preparations should be undramatic but capable of being picked up by Soviet intelligence, as suggested by Ambassador Thompson, or whether more extensive preparations are desirable, as is being suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This decision will have a direct bearing on:

 - (a) The reactions of our allies, who have shown mild nervousness regarding dramatic U.S. military steps.
 - (b) The reactions of the USSR, which the experts variously predict will be (i) ~~impressed~~, or (ii) made more aggressive by extensive U.S. preparations.
 - (c) The scale of the ground action that we will be capable of mounting, if such action becomes necessary.
 - (d) The period of further preparations that will be necessary after blockage of our access before ground action can be taken. If a prolonged period of airlift is acceptable between blockage and any substantial ground action, then some of the more fearsome preparations can probably be put off until the peak of the crisis, as suggested in Mr. Acheson's report.
2. The DOD Budget. The Secretary of Defense will submit recommendations by July 13 as to the magnitude and character of a permanent increase in the size of the U.S. defense establishment which might be executed in the event Soviet actions regarding Berlin appeared to foreshadow a long

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CWA 2.5 – The President's Daily Bulletin (Berlin Wall, 10 Berlin Issues)

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period of greatly heightened tensions.

Sovietologists who disagree on most everything else all seem to believe that plans for such an increase would be a potent deterrent, if the Soviets thought that we actually intended to proceed along these lines.

A decision will be needed as to whether to plan for such a large and lasting increase in the DOD budget and as to the actions, (e.g., Congressional consultation and DOD planning) which should be taken to bring this prospect to the Soviets' attention, without seeming to want to do so. This decision will need to be made fairly soon, if any U.S. actions are to be taken in time to affect Soviet plans.

3. Economic Pressures on the Bloc. State and Treasury will report by July 13 on needed preparations for economic counter-measures.

It seems doubtful that new decisions will be required immediately. Inter-allied planning for economic counter-measures is well underway. If and as this planning generates a need for Presidential decisions, these will be sought on an ad hoc basis from time to time.

4. U.S. Economic Dislocations. The Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers will submit by July 13 very preliminary views on what steps, if any, would be needed to protect the U.S. economy against economic dislocations resulting from military preparations.

Early decisions will be needed if the President decides on large-scale military preparations.

5. Subversion in East Germany. The Secretary of State [] will submit by July 13 recommendations as to the preparations, if any, which should be undertaken [] in event of a Berlin crisis.

When a decision on these preparations will be needed cannot be determined until we have the July 13 recommendations.

The nature of the decision is clear; we will need to decide on what scale the U.S. intends to prepare for action of this kind. There seems to be general agreement that the Soviets would be concerned if they thought we really meant business, but that they are too shrewd to be deceived by

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CWA 2.5 – The President's Daily Bulletin (Berlin Wall, 10 Berlin Issues)

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anything less than genuine preparations for substantial action -- with all the unpredictable consequences that this would involve for them and for us.

6. Propaganda. The Secretary of State and USIA will submit recommendations by July 13 about our public posture.

Decisions will be needed very shortly thereafter on the main themes of that posture and on the steps which should be taken to give it effect. A key question will be whether and, if so, when a Presidential address should be made.

7. East German Controls. The Secretary of State will spell out by July 13 the alternative courses we might adopt in our posture toward East Germans when they appear along the access routes after a peace treaty.

A decision will be required soon. The British have been at us on this issue ever since the MacMillan visit, and they will not be put off. The critical question is whether or not we are prepared to allow the East Germans to stamp allied military papers, as the Soviets do. Mr. Acheson recommends that we permit this; current contingency planning specifies that we should not.

8. Negotiations. The Secretary of State will also provide by July 13 his preliminary views concerning possible alternative negotiating positions regarding Berlin and Germany which we might adopt prior to a peace treaty.

A decision will be needed on our early, and hence less serious, negotiating positions fairly soon. Determination of the positions that we wish to strike when the real bargaining begins can -- and probably should -- be deferred for some time.

9. Our Allies. The Secretary of State will outline on July 13 his views as to the best way of seeking allied agreement on the various elements of our program indicated above.

An early decision will be needed as to the level and manner of this approach, and particularly as to the degree in which the heads of government should be involved.

10. Congressional Consultation. The Secretary of State will outline by July 13 a possible timetable of Congressional consultation.

An early decision will probably be needed as to the role the President should play in this consultation.

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CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (Berlin Wall)

Cable re: Subject Defected to West Berlin Police Evening of August 12, 1961. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/16/1961-08-13a.pdf.

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 - A. BOGDAN NIKOLAYEVICH STASHINSKY, DOB 4 NOV 1931, POB BORSCHCHOVTSY, NOVOYARYCHEVSKIY RAYON, LVOVSKAYA OBLAST, UKRAINIAN SSR, AKA JOSEF LEHMANN, DOB 4 NOV 1930, POB LUKOVEK, LUBLINSK.
 - B. WINGE LEHMANN NEE POHL, DOB 4 NOV 36, BERLIN-SPANDAU, RESIDES GEIBELSTRASSE 1, DALGOW BEI BERLIN.
2. SUBJ DEFECTED TO WEST BRN POLICE EVENING 12 AUG, TURNED OVER U.S. CUSTODY. SUBJ CLAIMS BE KGB NON-STAFF EMPLOYEE (NEGLASNI), WITH KGB SINCE 52, UNDERGOING TRAINING FOR FOREIGN ASSIGNMENT. SON AGE THREE MONTHS DIED RECENTLY. SUBJ CLAIMS GOT PERMISSION TRAVEL WITH ESCORT FROM RYEV TO BRN TO ATTEND SON'S FUNERAL ON 10 OR 11 AUG, TALKED WITH WIFE AND BOTH DECIDED DEFECT. DEBRIEFING BOTH UNDERWAY WITH BOB AND BRN STATION PARTICIPATION. USCOB NOTIFIED.
3. NO TRACE EITHER SUBJ BRN STATION FILES OR BOB FILES. REQUEST FRAN AND DIR TRACES.

END OF MESSAGE

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CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (The Bay of Pigs)

Timeline

1959:

- Revolutionary Fidel Castro leads a guerilla army into Cuba to overthrow General Fulgencio Batista. Batista is considered an ally to the United States because he allows American businesses and wealthy individuals to own Cuban plantations, cattle ranches, mines and utilities. Castro does not support this.

March, 1960

- President Eisenhower approves a CIA plan to train 1,400 Cuban exiles to invade Cuba, which he hopes would inspire ordinary Cubans to overthrow Castro and reinstate a government friendly to the US.
- Cuban intelligence learns of the training camps where exiles are planning the invasion in Guatemala.

May, 1960

- Castro establishes diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.
- US responds by prohibiting the importation of Cuban sugar; Soviet Union steps in to buy Cuban sugar.

January, 1961

- John F. Kennedy is inaugurated. Shortly thereafter he is briefed on the planned exile invasion; he authorizes the invasion plan, but argues that the US’ role should be kept secret. CIA plans to land the exiles at the Bay of Pigs, a swampy area on the southern coast of Cuba.

April 15, 1961

- To begin the invasion and provide cover for exiles, the US sends eight bombers, repainted to look like Cuban air force planes, to bomb Cuban airfields. The bombers miss many targets and pictures are released showing that the attacking planes are indeed US bombers repainted to avoid suspicion.

April 17, 1961

- 1,400 Cuban exiles land at Bay of Pigs and take heavy casualties from the Cuban air force and army.
- Castro orders 20,000 troops to attack the invaders and his air force to attack from the sky.


April 19, 1961

- Kennedy orders unmarked American planes to support, but they are late and shot down by the Cubans.
- More than 100 exiles are killed and close to 1,200 surrender to Castro. Castro imprisons them for 20 months. The US eventually pays for their release with \$53, 000,000 worth of baby food and medicine.

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (The Bay of Pigs)

Source: Statement by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy on Cuba and Neutrality Laws, April 20, 1961.

Source: National Archives, ARC 193990



CWA 2.5 – The President's Daily Bulletin (The Bay of Pigs)

White House Memorandum (TOP SECRET), [Proposal for Command Operation in Cuba, November 1, 1961.

Source: NSA Archive at George Washington University, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/bayofpigs/19611101.pdf>~~TOP SECRET~~THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONEYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

November 1, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:


I believe that the concept of a "command operation" for Cuba, as discussed with you by the Attorney General, is the only effective way to handle an all-out attack on the Cuban problem. Since I understand you are favorably disposed toward the idea I will not discuss why the present disorganized and uncoordinated operation cannot do the job effectively.

The beauty of such an operation over the next few months is that we cannot lose. If the best happens we will unseat Castro. If not, then at least we will emerge with a stronger underground, better propaganda and a far clearer idea of the dimensions of the problems which affect us.

The question then is who should head this operation. I know of no one currently in Cuban affairs at the State Department who can do it. Nor is it a very good idea to get the State Department involved in depth in such covert activities. I do not think it should be centered in the CIA. Even if the CIA can find someone of sufficient force and stature, one of the major problems will be to revamp CIA operations and thinking -- and this will be very hard to do from the inside.

I believe that the Attorney General would be the most effective commander of such an operation. Either I or someone else should be assigned to him as Deputy for this activity, since he obviously will not be able to devote full time to it. The one danger here is that he might become too closely identified with what might not be a successful operation. Indeed, chances of success are very speculative. There are a few answers to this:

(1) Everyone knowledgeable in these affairs -- in and out of government -- is aware that the United States is already helping the underground. The precise manner of aid may be unknown but the fact of aid is common knowledge. We will be blamed for not winning Cuba back whether or not we have a "command operation" and whether or not the Attorney General heads it.

EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT~~TOP SECRET~~

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (The Bay of Pigs, Kennedy Address)

Editor’s Note: The following excerpt is from a speech given by President John F. Kennedy before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Washington, DC, April 20, 1961. Source: The Department of State Bulletin, XLIV, No. 1141 May 8, 1961.

“The President of a great democracy such as ours, and the editors of great newspapers such as yours, owe a common obligation to the people: an obligation to present the facts, to present them with candor, and to present them in perspective....

On that unhappy island, as in so many other areas of the contest for freedom, the news has grown worse instead of better. I have emphasized before that this was a struggle of Cuban patriots against a Cuban dictator. While we could not be expected to lend our sympathies, we made it repeatedly clear that the armed forces of this country would not intervene in any way....

[T]here are from this sobering episode useful lessons for all to learn. Some may be still obscure and await further information. Some are clear today.



President John F. Kennedy, head-and-shoulders portrait, facing front. US Navy Photo, 1961. Source: Library of Congress, <http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/96523447/>

First, it is clear that the forces of communism are not to be underestimated; in Cuba or anywhere else in the world. The advantages of a police state - its use of mass terror and arrests to prevent the spread of free dissent - cannot be overlooked by those who expect the fall of every fanatic tyrant ...

Secondly, it is clear that this Nation, in concert with all the free nations of this hemisphere, must take all even closer and more realistic look- at the menace of external Communist intervention and domination in Cuba. The American people are not complacent about Iron Curtain tanks and planes less than 90 miles from our shores...

Third, and finally, it is clearer than ever that we face a relentless struggle in every corner of the globe that goes far beyond the clash of armies or even nuclear armaments.... But they serve primarily as the shield behind which subversion, infiltration, and a host of other tactics steadily advance....

The message of Cuba, of Laos, of the rising din of Communist voices in Asia and Latin America - these messages are all the same. The complacent, the self-indulgent, the soft societies are about to be swept away with the debris of history. Only the strong, only the industrious, only the determined, only the courageous, only the visionary who determine the real nature of our struggle can possibly survive.”

CWA 2.5 – The President's Daily Bulletin (The Bay of Pigs, Canadian Analysis)

Dispatch from Canadian Ambassador to Cuba, June 15, 1961 to the Canadian Government in Ottawa. Source: The National Security Archive at George Washington University, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/bayofpigs/19610615.pdf>.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.	
DESPATCH	
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.	Security: <u>CONFIDENTIAL</u>
FROM: ...The Canadian Charge d'Affaires, a.i.,Canadian Embassy, HAVANA, Cuba.....	No: <u>D-397</u>
Reference:.....	Date: <u>June 15, 1961</u>
Subject: <u>Cuba - Final Impressions</u>	Enclosures: <u>1</u>
	Air or Surface Mail: <u>Air</u>
	Post File No: <u>12-2-2</u>
	Ottawa File No. <u>10224-110</u>
	<u>96</u> <u>96</u>
References O/P/M (Mr. Richardson) OISSEA (Mr. Campbell) USSEA Mr. Cadogan Mr. Poirer Mr. Ignatieff European USA F.A. Executive A.P. + M.E. Communication Environ. Sec. (Mr. Poirer) all L.A. Poirer D.L. 2 D.L. 1 Pass E.M.B. Rome Latin Am. Div. + file (B)	cc 438-110 cc 513-110 cc 4568-110
Internal Circulation Done lb D. L. (2) Div. (Done by In-mail Distribution Section)	
Distribution to Posts Washington Mexico Rio de Janeiro Buenos Aires Moscow Prague	

After less than five months in Cuba I cannot simulate erudition concerning developments in this country. However, a brief outline of my impressions as they apply to the climactic events of April may be useful to you and to our Ambassador-designate.

2. The defeat of the April 17 "invasion" of Cuba by anti-Castro exiles can already be seen in retrospect as a decisive point-of-no-return for the Castro regime, and perhaps also for the Cuban people. This misadventure substantiated the Government's warnings against imperialist aggression from the United States; the ardent patriotism which it excited enabled the Castro regime to suppress all internal opposition, to step up the pace of its "socialist" revolution and to sanctify as sacrifices the exigencies of the economic crisis which Cuba is experiencing. As a result, Cuba now appears to be irrevocably committed to be a proletarian dictatorship of the communist pattern and to a foreign policy that conforms closely to Soviet international objectives in Latin America, the United Nations and elsewhere.

Foreign Policy

3. For many months before the exile assault Prime Minister Castro had been attempting to convince the Cuban people that they must be armed and prepared to defend Cuba against the onslaught of revanchist United States imperialism. He assured them that against such a powerful enemy they could not stand alone, and Cuba had therefore to seek support and friendship in the Sino-Soviet bloc. Many Cubans remained unconvinced of the validity of either of these basic principles of Castro's foreign policy. Castro's cries of "invasion invasion", when there had been no invasion, had increased Cuban doubts; and repugnance toward communism as well as imperialism was an inherent part of the pure nationalism that the Cuban leader so fervently inspired.

4. This situation changed dramatically on April 17. The "invasion" proved, at least to the satisfaction of the previously unconvinced, that Castro had been correct. Armed forces supported by the United States had, in fact, attempted to reconquer Cuba. They had failed because Cubans fought fiercely for Cuba's right to self-determination. The Sino-Soviet bloc had responded promptly with assurances of solidarity and "all necessary aid". Castro had welcomed these assurances and had committed his Government's foreign policy to closer alignment with the bloc. In the process, any possibility of a return to friendly relations with the United States had disappeared -- perhaps forever.

...2

CWA 2.5 – The President's Daily Bulletin (The Bay of Pigs, Canadian Analysis)

- 2 -

5. The aftermath of the debacle was increased intransigence toward the United States and greater affinity with the Sino-Soviet bloc:

(a) The United States was denounced in abusive terms for fomenting, preparing and assisting the aggressors. President Kennedy was violently vilified for his support of the so-called Revolutionary Council and his personal responsibility for the fiasco. United States foreign policy throughout the world was ridiculed as an expression of economic avarice and political decadence. NATO, SEATO, CENTO, France, West Germany, Portugal, Spain, Laos, the Congo and innumerable others were cited as instruments of aggressive United States international intentions.

(b) The Soviet Union, China and other bloc states were praised for their peaceful and friendly attitudes. New or augmented trade agreements and cultural exchanges were signed with the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia. (The latter country seems to have a special place in the Cuban sun, probably to demonstrate the degree of industrial refinement that can be achieved under Soviet auspices.) Soviet policies were explained in greater detail, displayed with more prominence and praised with more lavish superlatives.

(c) Latin America was treated with more restraint than when Cuba was threatening to spread its "socialist" revolution throughout the continent. Cuban propaganda confined itself to proselytism by example. This less blatant Cuban posture is in accord with the subtler Soviet ambitions and techniques in the sub-continent. The Cuban aim now appeared to be to cultivate support rather than foment revolution in Latin American countries. Brazil, Mexico and Ecuador received special attention and commendation for opposing any intervention in Cuba.

(d) In the United Nations General Assembly, far from displaying any independent judgment, Cuba intrigued and voted with the Soviet bloc; outspoken and unashamed support was given to Soviet policies on disarmament, nuclear testing, the Congo, and other items.

(d) At the sub-summit meeting of "neutralist" and "unaligned" nations in Cairo, Cuba's presence prejudiced representation of other Latin American countries because, in fact, the Cuban Government is now much more firmly and fundamentally committed to the Soviet bloc than any of the other nations attending. It was not clear whether Cuba was maintaining a watching brief for the Soviet bloc or whether it intended to use the meetings as a forum for further denunciations of United States imperialism.

Internal Political Situation

6. In the first few months of 1961 Castro's political fortunes appeared to be declining. His agricultural and industrial reform programmes had hardly begun to produce tangible results. His dictatorial methods and his tiresome propaganda were becoming onerous. He and his revolution were losing their glamour. He still enjoyed fanatical support among the poor and under-privileged but the middle class and the intellectuals had deserted him, and many other former supporters were wavering. Counter-revolutionary plots and sabotage were increasing and Government repression seemed only to make matters worse.

...3

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (The Bay of Pigs, Map of Cuba)

Source: The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cu.html>.




CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (The Bay of Pigs)



ST-19-3-62 29 December 1962 Miami, Florida Address to the 2506 Cuban Invasion Brigade at the Orange Bowl Stadium. Mrs. Kennedy speaks informally with Brigade leaders Eneido Oliva, Jose Perez San Roman, Manuel Artime, and former Cuban President Jose Miro Cardona after the ceremonies. Photograph by Cecil Stoughton, White House,. Source: John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/H55aYSncgkGYZPzBVLTOIA.aspx>

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (The Bay of Pigs)

Fidel Castro arrives MATS Terminal, Washington, D.C., April 15, 1959. Photographer: Warren K. Leffler. Source: Library of Congress: <http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2004672759/>



CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (The Bay of Pigs)

[Fidel Castro and Nikita Khrushchev make their way in the midst of a crowd] / World Telegram & Sun photo by Herman Hiller, 1960. Source: Library of Congress, <http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/00652628>.



CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (The Bay of Pigs, Castro Denounces US Aggression)

Editor’s Note: The following is an excerpt from a speech given by Fidel Castro on Cuban radio on March 23, 1961. The speech was recorded by the US Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Source: Latin American Information Center, <http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/castro.html>.

The aggression was indirect only in regard to the personnel. It was direct aggression in that it came from camps of the North Americans, that North American equipment was used, and that it included a convoy by the US Navy and the participation of the US Air Force. It was a combined thing: they used mercenaries amply supported by the navy and air force.

...

We have always been in danger of direct aggression. We have been warning about this in the United Nations: that they would find a pretext, that they would organize some act of aggression so that they could intervene. That is why we have followed a cautious policy in regard to Guantanamo Base.

...

They are the ones who are bringing the world to the brink of war through their warlike spirit, their own contradictions, and their economic problems which cause them to provoke a series of crises in order to maintain their war economy. Their factories run only when they are building war material. Their regime is marching toward a crisis. It is not like our economy, which is perfectly planned.

...

They have the capacity to do all sorts of things for the benefit of their people. But their system demands production for war, not peace. As a result, there is extensive wasting of nature resources. Look at their military budget. What they could do with this money for schools, industry, homes. What good it could mean for the world.

And that is only part of the story. Some of their factories are working on a part-time basis. How different from the Soviet Union, where everyone works! If someone wants to build a factory in the United States, he does so whether it is needed or not. This is the result of an unplanned economy. In the United States, war militarizes the economy. They plan for that.

The government does not permit any monopoly to produce what they want-- they have to produce war materials. Then the government plans and controls production--they produce fantastically. In time of war they plan. then all the people work. They are not capable of solving the problem of unemployment in producing for peace. Only in time of war can they resolve their economic crisis. That is why there are groups who wish to go on a war footing, if possible, with local wars. This has been the American policy after World War Two. With respect to our country, they have been holding these ideas of aggression. We have been and are now facing that threat.

Concerning the type of aggression against us: How could they organize a mercenary force against the united people, against our army and militia? They did not think about that type of war. They thought of a frontal attack with mercenaries and of taking over our country.

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (The Cuban Missile Crisis)

Editor’s Note: Analysts preparing the Cuban Missile Crisis report should review the Bay of Pigs Timeline prior to reading the Missile Crisis Timeline below for additional context.

Timeline

Summer, 1962

- In July, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and Cuban leader Fidel Castro, make a secret agreement to place Soviet nuclear missiles on Cuban soil to both deter an American invasion of Cuba and provide the Soviet Union with the opportunity to strike the continental United States with nuclear weapons.
- In August, Soviet workers begin construction of missile sites on Cuban soil. American intelligence officers warn Kennedy that this initial construction might lead to a base for ballistic missiles.
- Soviet leaders, including US Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, publicly deny any suggestion of efforts to put offensive weapons on Cuban soil.

October 14

- An American U-2 spy plane takes several pictures of the missile sites under construction in Cuba. These sites were designed for both medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles (MRBM and IRBM). Both could reach US soil if launched.

October 15-16

- The CIA analyzes the U-2 images, and then notifies the Department of State, which notifies National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy on October 15.
- Bundy tells President Kennedy on October 16, sharing the U-2 photos and the CIA’s analysis.
- Kennedy convenes a group of advisors, including members of the National Security Council – later known as EXCOMM (Executive Committee of the National Security Council) to discuss options:
 - Diplomatic pressure
 - Do nothing
 - Send a warning
 - Naval blockade
 - Air strike
 - Invasion of Cuba

October 19, 1962

- U-2 spy planes document four sites now ready for missiles. US military put on high alert.
- Consensus by EXCOMM reached that a naval blockade to quarantine Cuba was the best option.

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (The Cuban Missile Crisis)

Timeline (continued)

October 22

- US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Foy Kohler, informs Khrushchev of impending blockade.
- At 7:00 pm, President Kennedy gives a televised address, announcing the discovery of the missile sites and the American plan for blockade.

October 24

- Khrushchev warns Kennedy that the blockade is “piracy” that will lead to war; US troop alert condition raised to DEFCON 2, the step immediately preceding nuclear war.

October 25

- Kennedy responds to Khrushchev’s telegram, arguing that the US is forced to respond given the proximity of weapons.

October 26

- The State Department receives a hand-written note from Khrushchev opening the door for negotiation as long as the US promised not to invade Cuba.

October 27

- Khrushchev sends another message, seeking a deal where the US would remove its missiles from Greece and Turkey, in return for the removal of Soviet weapons from Cuba.
- An American U-2 plane was shot down by a Soviet commander; its pilot died. Another American plane accidentally crosses into Soviet territory, which leads to both sides preparing fighters.
- Negotiations continue between the US and the Soviet Union; both seek an end to the crisis while preparing for war.

October 28, 1962

- Kennedy agrees to remove all missiles from Italy and Turkey and Khrushchev agrees to remove all missiles from Cuba.
- The US blockade ends on November 20, after confirming Soviet removal of missiles and launch sites.



800 women strikers for peace on 47 St near the UN Bldg / World Telegram & Sun photo by Phil Stanziola, 1962. Source: Library of Congress, <http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2001696167/>

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (The Cuban Missile Crisis)

Source: The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cu.html>.



CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (The Cuban Missile Crisis)

President John F. Kennedy meets with members of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EXCOMM) regarding the crisis in Cuba. Clockwise from top right side of table: Under Secretary of State George Ball, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, President Kennedy, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Maxwell D. Taylor, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Paul Nitze, Acting Director of the United States Information Agency (USIA) Donald Wilson, Special Counsel to the President Theodore C. Sorensen, Special Assistant to the President for National Security McGeorge Bundy (mostly hidden), Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson (mostly hidden), Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, former US Ambassador to the Soviet Union Llewellyn Thompson, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) William C. Foster, and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) John McCone (mostly hidden behind Director Foster). Cabinet Room, White House, Washington, D.C., October 29, 1962.



Source: John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston. National Archives ST-A26-1-62. <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKWHP-ST-A26-1-62.aspx>.

CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (The Cuban Missile Crisis)

President John F. Kennedy with Members of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, October 29, 1962. President John F. Kennedy (back to camera) speaks with members of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EXCOMM) in the West Wing Colonnade outside the Oval Office, White House, Washington, D.C. (L-R) President Kennedy, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Paul Nitze, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Maxwell D. Taylor, and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. The President met with members of the EXCOMM that day regarding the crisis in Cuba. Source: John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston. National Archives Accession # ST-A26-12-62. <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKWHP-1962-10-29-A.aspx>.



CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (The Cuban Missile Crisis)

President John F. Kennedy Signs Cuba Quarantine Order, October 23, 1962. Robert L. Knudsen, Photographer. Source: John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston. National Archive Accession # KN-C24732.

<http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKWHP-KN-C24732.aspx>.




CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (The Cuban Missile Crisis)

Map of Missile Range in Cuba (2), 1962. Source: National Archives, ARC Identifier 595351; Item from Collection JFK-222: Theodore Sorensen Papers, 1934 – 2003. Online access: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, <http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org/post/gallery/map-of-missile-range-in-cuba-2/>.



CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (The Cuban Missile Crisis)

Aerial Photograph of Intercontinental Range Ballistic Missile Launch Site Number One at Guanajay, Cuba, October 23, 1962. Source: National Archives, ARC Identifier 193934. Item from Collection JFK-PXDOD: United States Department of Defense, 1961 – 1963. Online access: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, <http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org/post/gallery/intercontinental-range-ballistic-missile-launch-site-number-one/>.



CWA 2.5 – The President’s Daily Bulletin (The Cuban Missile Crisis, Khrushchev’s Message)

Editor’s note: the following message was sent by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to President Kennedy, on October 27, 1962: Source: National Archives, “Translation of message from Khrushchev to Kennedy concerning proposal put forth by U Thant to resolve Cuban Missile Crisis.” National Archives Identifier, 193377.

FBIS 49

TEXT OF KHRUSHCHEV MESSAGE TO KENNEDY

MOSCOW DOMESTIC SERVICE IN RUSSIAN 1400 27 OCT 62 L

(TEXT) ESTEEMED MR. PRESIDENT: I HAVE ACQUAINTED MYSELF WITH MUCH SATISFACTION WITH YOUR REPLY TO U THANT TO THE EFFECT THAT STEPS WILL BE TAKEN TO EXCLUDE CONTACT BETWEEN OUR SHIPS AND THUS AVOID IRREMEDABLE FATEFUL CONSEQUENCES. THIS REASONABLE STEP ON YOUR PART STRENGTHENS MY (BELIEF) THAT YOU ARE SHOWING CONCERN TO SAFEGUARD PEACE, AND I NOTE THIS WITH SATISFACTION.

I HAVE ALREADY SAID THAT OUR PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT AND I PERSONALLY, AS CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, ARE CONCERNED SOLELY THAT OUR COUNTRIES SHOULD DEVELOP AND OCCUPY A WORTHY PLACE AMONG PEOPLE OF THE WORLD IN ECONOMIC COMPETITION, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CULTURE AND ARTS, AND THE RAISING OF THE WELL-BEING OF PEOPLE. THIS IS THE MOST NOBLE AND NECESSARY FIELD FOR COMPETITION, AND VICTORS AND VANQUISHED WILL ONLY (WORD INDISTINCT) FROM IT, BECAUSE THIS MEANS PEACE AND INCREASED COMMODITIES FOR THE LIFE AND ENJOYMENT OF MAN.

IN YOUR STATEMENT, YOU SUPPORTED THE OPINION THAT THE MAIN AIM WAS NOT ONLY TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT AND TAKE MEASURES TO PREVENT CONTACT BETWEEN OUR SHIPS--AND THEREFORE THE DEEPENING OF THE CRISIS WHICH MAY AS A RESULT OF SUCH A CONTACT STRIKE THE FIRE OF A MILITARY CONFLICT AFTER WHICH ALL TALKS WOULD BE SUPERFLUOUS, BECAUSE OTHER FORCES AND LAWS WOULD COME INTO FORCE--THE LAWS OF WAR. I AGREE WITH YOU THAT THIS IS ONLY THE FIRST STEP. THE MAIN THING THAT MUST BE DONE IS TO NORMALIZE AND STABILIZE THE STATE OF PEACE AMONG STATES AND PEOPLE.

I UNDERSTAND YOUR CONCERN FOR THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATE, MR. PRESIDENT, BECAUSE THIS IS THE FIRST DUTY OF A PRESIDENT. HOWEVER, WE ARE WORRIED ABOUT THE SAME QUESTIONS, AND I BEAR THE SAME OBLIGATIONS AS CHAIRMAN OF THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS.

YOU HAVE BEEN WORRIED CONCERNING THE FACT THAT WE HAVE HELPED CUBA WITH WEAPONS WITH THE AIM OF STRENGTHENING ITS DEFENSIVE CAPACITY--YES, PRECISELY ITS "DEFENSIVE CAPACITY"--BECAUSE NO MATTER WHAT WEAPONS IT POSSESSES, CUBA CANNOT EQUAL YOU. THESE ARE DIFFERENT QUANTITIES, ALL THE MORE SO IF ONE TAKES INTO CONSIDERATION THE MODERN MEANS OF EXTERMINATION.

OUR AIM HAS BEEN AND STILL IS TO HELP CUBA. AND NO ONE CAN DENY THE HUMANENESS OF OUR MOTIVES, WHICH ARE TO ENABLE CUBA TO LIVE IN PEACE AND DEVELOP IN THE WAY ITS PEOPLE DESIRE.

(MORE)

27 OCT 1103A WLM/HM